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REINFORCING REPRESENTATION:
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO ENFORCE
THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENTS IN THE REHNQUIST AND
WAITE COURTS
Ellen D. Katz*
INTRODUCTION
A large body of academic scholarship accuses the Rehnquist Court
of "undoing the Second Reconstruction,"' just as the Waite Court has
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1. See, e.g., J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 2, 67-68, 368 (1999) (argu-
ing that Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny "threaten[] to reverse the course
of minority political success during the Second Reconstruction"); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1097-99 (2001)
(arguing that "in may ways, the constitutional vision of the conservative [members of the
Rehnquist Court] resembles the interpretation of the Northern Democrats who were hostile
to Reconstruction"); Lisa Cardyn, Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the
Body Politic in the Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 859 (2002) (arguing that
decisions by the Rehnquist and Waite Courts similarly restrict civil-rights laws); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 68 (1991)
(describing the 1989 civil-rights decisions of the Supreme Court as "the equivalent of the
Compromise of 1877, which ended the first Reconstruction"); Virginia E. Hench, The Death
of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 727, 755 & nn.131-32 (1998) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court is "squarely at the fore-
front of 19th Century jurisprudence, adopting the rationales that were used to strike down
the original post-Civil War Civil Rights Statutes"); John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five and the
Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091,
1093, 1096 (2000) (stating that specific Rehnquist Court decisions reflect an "Anti-
Reconstruction... 'philosophy' that has been adopted and imposed on our country by the
Gang of Five" and arguing that "we are witnessing the return of an Anti-Reconstruction Su-
preme Court"); James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Con-
sent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 561 (1999)
(arguing that the end of the Second Reconstruction has resulted from "judicial intransi-
gence" similar to that which ended the First); Pamela S. Karlan, End of the Second Recon-
struction? Voting Rights and the Court, NATION, May 23, 1994, at 698, 700 [hereinafter Kar-
lan, End of the Second Reconstruction?] (arguing that "the Supreme Court has relentlessly
chipped away at the foundations of the Second Reconstruction").
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long been blamed for facilitating the end of the First.2 This critique
captures much3 of what is meant by those generally charging
the Rehnquist Court with "conservative judicial activism."'4 It posits
that the present Court wants to dismantle decades' worth of federal
antidiscrimination measures that are aimed at the "reconstruction" of
public and private relationships at the local level.' It sees the Waite
Court as having similarly nullified the civil-rights initiatives enacted by
Congress following the Civil War to reconstruct the former Confeder-
acy. And it maintains that both Courts' willingness to invalidate fed-
eral statutes and limit congressional power evinces the view that much
2. See sources cited infra note 36 and accompanying text.
3. But not all. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1045-51 (critiquing Bush v. Gore,
531 U.S. 98 (2000), as an example of conservative judicial activism); see also Peter M. Shane,
Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for
Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 582 (2002).
4. For claims that the Rehnquist Court engages in conservative judicial activism, see, for
example, Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1081; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional Expansion of Rights, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601,
602 (1998) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitu-
tional Expansion of Rights] (describing various federalism decisions as displaying "conserva-
tive judicial activism"); Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in
Theory and Practice, 83 MARO. L. REV. 435, 441 (1999) (stating that "the new judicial activ-
ism ... employ[s] general notions of federalism that are not anchored in the Constitution's
words" and "ignore[s] some of its basic principles in certain cases [and] produce[s] results..
that are unprincipled and even ideologically biased"); Steven A. Light, Too (Color)blind to
See: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Rehnquist Court, 8 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS.
L.J. 1, 3 (1997-1998) (stating that "the convergence of judicial activism and ideological con-
servatism that characterizes the Rehnquist Court... suggests that the Second Reconstruc-
tion is at a turning point" (internal citation omitted)); Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old
Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201
(2000); and Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000,
at A33 (arguing that "[t]he Rehnquist Court has been using law to reshape politics for at a
least a decade" and that "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day").
5. C. Vann Woodward coined the phrase "Second Reconstruction" in 1965 to describe a
series of then-new federal civil-rights initiatives. C. Vann Woodward, From the First Recon-
struction to the Second, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1965, at 127. The phrase is now understood to
encompass a wide range of federal mandates and programs. See, e.g., KOUSSER, supra note
1, at 12-13 (describing 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act as part of the Second Re-
construction); Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren,
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 161 (1998) (categorizing the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 as "perhaps ... [the] last reconstructive moment" of the Second Re-
construction); Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Sec-
ond Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 378, 383-86 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
(same); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 448 & nn.24-25 (2000) (de-
scribing the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA"), and the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 as part of the Sec-
ond Reconstruction); Michael J. Zimer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 234 (1998) (stating that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "revi-
taliz[ed] the Second Reconstruction"); see also NUMAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM,
SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 19 (1975); MANNING
MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK
AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2nd ed. 1991).
Reinforcing Representation
federal civil-rights legislation represents an impermissible redistribu-
tive project and an unconstitutional interference with state and local
autonomy.6
This Article argues that the critique that the Rehnquist Court is
"undoing the Second Reconstruction" is too simple, but not only be-
cause it fails to account for last Term's relatively "moderate" deci-
sions.7 A parallel indeed exists between the Rehnquist Court's
response to the Second Reconstruction and the Waite Court's reaction
to the First. Decisions by both Courts, however, respond to Recon-
struction not with undifferentiated hostility, but instead in a more
complex manner. This Article attempts to show that these decisions
posit a two-tiered vision of Congress's enforcement powers under
the Reconstruction-era Amendments. Under this vision, Congress
possesses broad discretion to free state political processes of racial
discrimination,8 but enjoys far more limited authority to combat other
forms of discrimination at the state and local level.
This disaggregation of Congress's enforcement powers may be
understood to reflect the view that individual liberty is best protected
at the state level, but only so long as the "healthy organization of the
government itself" is maintained.9 State government must represent
"the free choice of the people,""° but racial discrimination in voting
prevents States from fulfilling this function. Decisions by both Courts
accord deference to congressional efforts to block such discrimination
and thereby to reinforce representative governance at the state level.
They countenance this broad congressional power in order to preserve
the primacy of state authority elsewhere."1
6. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1052-61 (arguing that "[i]n the past ten
years, the Supreme Court of the United States has begun a systematic reappraisal of doc-
trines concerning federalism, racial equality, and civil rights that, if fully successful, will
redraw the constitutional map as we have known it"); Fruehwald, supra note 4, at 441;
Nowak, supra note 1, at 1098 (stating that "the Gang of Five cannot disguise the fact that
they have nothing but disdain for the federal system that our country adopted both in 1787
and following the Civil War"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti Anti-Discrimination Agenda, 111
YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 (2002) (stating that "some of the Court's federalism cases are not
really federalism cases at all"); see also Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative
Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139 (2002) (discussing elements thought to comprise conser-
vative judicial activism).
7. See, e.g.,Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); see also Tony Mauro, A Timeout for Conservative Agenda,
LEGAL TIMES, June 30, 2003, at 1; Editorial, A Moderate Term on the Court, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2003, § 4, at 12 (stating "the highest court of all has surprised many people with its
moderation").
8. See infra Parts I & II.
9. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666 (1884); see also infra note 293 and accompa-
nying text.
10. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666.
11. See infra Part Ili.
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The first two Parts of this Article seek to establish that decisions by
both Courts defer more to congressional efforts to rid local political
processes of racial discrimination than to other types of congressional
antidiscrimination measures. These Parts do not argue that both
Courts deliberately set out to recognize a special realm in which they
would defer to congressional power and indeed take no position
on the justices' subjective motivation on this point. Nor do they main-
tain that deference in this realm necessarily precludes deference to
Congress in other arenas.12 Instead, they locate within decisions by
both Courts evidence that both defer considerably to Congress in the
realm of race and the vote.
Part I discusses a series of Waite Court decisions that circumscribe
congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction-era Amend-
ments. Scholars frequently cite United States v. Reese, 3 United States v.
Cruikshank,14 United States v. Harris,5 and the Civil Rights Cases"6 as
evidence of the Waite Court's resistance to the First Reconstruction's
political project." The Waite Court threw out federal indictments,
opined unnecessarily on a host of constitutional questions, and invali-
dated federal enforcement legislation as falling outside congressional
12. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003), for example, suggests
that the Court may also defer to congressional efforts to combat gender discrimination. The
scope of such a principle and the strength of the Court's commitment to it are as yet unclear.
Hibbs holds that state employees may recover money damages in federal court if a state em-
ployer violates the family care provisions under the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"). Id. at 1976. States typically enjoy immunity from such suits, see, e.g., Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and, in recent years, the Court has struck down
congressional efforts to abrogate this immunity in statutes quite similar to the FMLA. See
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding unconstitutional
attempted abrogation of state immunity in the ADA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000) (same, for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")). Hibbs
accordingly surprised many observers by upholding the FMLA as a permissible exercise of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr.,
Court Surprises With Family Leave Act Ruling, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 30, 2003, at 21
(quoting Nina Pillard, who argued for Hibbs, as stating that "[iut certainly was the case that
the smart money was on my opponents" and citing speculation that Hibbs had a "95%
chance" of losing (internal quotation marks omitted)), available at LEXIS, ABA Library,
ERPORT File. Denying any conflict with precedent, Hibbs insists that the heightened judi-
cial scrutiny accorded to gender-based distinctions provides Congress greater leeway to craft
statutes such as the FMLA than it enjoys when it targets discrimination against nonsuspect
groups. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982. That leeway, however, requires not only the targeting of
gender-based discrimination, but also a statutory remedy that falls comfortably within Con-
gress's commerce power. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (rejecting con-
gressional power to subject private parties to liability under the VAWA); see also Marcia
Coyle, Follow the People, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 2003, at S1 (noting tensions between Hibbs
and Morrison).
13. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
14. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
15. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
16. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
17. See sources cited infra notes 36, 54.
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authority. And yet the Court left open significant opportunities for
Congress to reach deeply into local affairs to protect black-voting
strength."i
Part II identifies a similar proclivity in a series of Rehnquist Court
decisions that address Congress's power to frame antidiscrimination
measures. City of Boerne v. Flores9 circumscribes congressional power
to enforce the Reconstruction-era Amendments.20 Boerne and nearly
all of its progeny2 l invalidate congressional statutes, exhibit a prefer-
ence for state and local power over federal authority,22 and evince a
seeming antipathy to federal civil-rights initiatives and the social engi-
neering they represent.23  All the Boerne cases, however, self-
consciously preserve precedent upholding provisions of the Voting
Rights Act ("VRA") against constitutional challenge. 24 They do so
notwithstanding the displacement of local autonomy that results from
enforcement of the VRA's race-conscious antidiscrimination princi-
ples,25 and the seeming doctrinal inconsistencies that exist between these
cases and the Boerne doctrine.26
The Rehnquist Court's careful preservation of the VRA precedent
becomes even more puzzling when juxtaposed with much of the Court's
contemporary voting-rights decisions. The constitutional injury recog-
nized in Shaw v. Reno27 and its progeny28 hinders the easy deployment of
18. See infra Part I.
19. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20. See Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001) [hereinafter Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Con-
straints on Section 5 Powers]; see also infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (discussing
the novelty of the Boerne holdings and their departure from precedent).
21. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll.
Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The
exception is Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). See supra
note 12.
22. See infra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 525; see also infra notes 115-123 and accom-
panying text.
24. The Boerne decisions preserve City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); and
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). See infra notes 157-159 and accompany-
ing text (discussing preservation of VRA precedent in Boerne decisions).
For a discussion of the history and structure of the VRA, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET
AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, 546-48, 556-57 (2d ed. 2001).
25. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 160-165 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrinal inconsisten-
cies between the early VRA precedent and the Boerne decisions).
27. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
28. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
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race-conscious districting practices.29 Miserly readings of the VRA in
several cases over the past decade accord Congress insufficient defer-
ence." Read together, these decisions appear to manifest hostility to
the VRA and to the larger federal project of which it is a central
component.3 And yet, as Part II argues, they do not disavow broad
congressional power to block racial discrimination in voting. Instead,
they reflect the Court's judgment that the United States Department
of Justice ("DOJ") and state officials have relied too prominently
and rigidly on race when regulating political processes and have
misconstrued the VRA as providing authority to do so.32
Parts III and IV offer and evaluate an explanation for why deci-
sions by both the Rehnquist and Waite Courts might recognize a
distinctly broad congressional power to address racial discrimination
in voting. The goal is not to establish subjective motivation, but
instead to offer a conceptual framework grounded in decisional text
that might explain the doctrinal path followed by both Courts.
Part III argues that decisions by both the Waite and Rehnquist
Courts defer to congressional power in the realm of race and the vote
as a means to reinforce representative governance at the state level.
Implicit in these decisions is the conviction that state governments
best protect individual liberty, and that only inclusive electoral proce-
dures enable the State to perform this protective role. Fostering effec-
tive state governance is thought to render unnecessary more intrusive
and extensive federal regulation, and thus most faithfully to comport
with the federal structure.33
Part IV explores the limits of the Rehnquist Court's deferential
stance toward Congress. The constitutionality of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act is currently an open question.34 This Part argues
that the Court should uphold its validity insofar as the deference
it presently accords Congress reflects a functional understanding of
congressional power to reinforce representation in the states. Never-
theless, the realm in which racial discrimination affects the political
process is potentially vast, and numerous competing and controversial
techniques are available to address such discrimination. Left
unchecked, congressional power in this realm might easily become
29. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier
Parish 11]; Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471 (1997) [hereinafter Bossier Parish
f]; Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491
(1992); see also Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997); infra notes 221-225, 234-244 and ac-
companying text.
31. See infra Section lI.B.
32. See infra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 276-277 and accompanying text.
34. See sources cited infra note 356 and accompanying text.
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plenary over an immense range of conduct. Precedent suggests that
the Rehnquist Court will not countenance such an expansion of
congressional power. The Court may accordingly seek to cabin con-
gressional authority by decreeing only limited conduct to be suffi-
ciently voting-related to warrant congressional proscription. And, as
Bush v. Gore" indicates, it may be willing to identify new substantive
constitutional norms governing democratic structure. These norms, in
turn, may curtail congressional discretion to regulate the political pro-
cess. Such efforts may render section 2 invalid, and, more broadly,
eliminate entirely the realm in which the Court presently defers to
Congress. Were the Court to do so, it would indeed "undo" the
Second Reconstruction.
I. THE WAITE COURT AND THE ENFORCEMENT ACTS
The critique that the Rehnquist Court is undoing the Second
Reconstruction evokes the longstanding assessment that the Waite
Court contributed significantly to the end of the First.36 Read together,
decisions such as United States v. Reese,37 United States v. Cruikshank,"
35. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
36. For this critique of the Waite Court, see, for example, HAROLD M. HYMAN &
WILLIAM W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
1835-1875, at 488 (1982) (crediting the Waite Court with leading "the judicial retreat from
Reconstruction"); RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 105-06 (enlarged
ed. 1965) (noting role of Waite Court in the demise of Reconstruction); Davidson &
Grofman, supra note 5, at 378 (characterizing "the complicity of the federal courts" as a nec-
essary component of southern redemption); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of
Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-37 (1952) (describing Waite Court de-
cisions along with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), as a "[j]udicial
[cloup d'[e]tat" in which "the bold motives and the brave arguments of the architects of the
constitutional revolution in civil rights were forgotten under the din of a judicial rewriting of
their efforts"); and Karlan, End of the Second Reconstruction?, supra note 1, at 698 (arguing
that during the 1870s and 1880s, "the Court gutted the First Reconstruction by invalidating
or misconstruing a series of critical Congressional protections of black political and eco-
nomic rights"). See also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing historians' assess-
ment of Reese and Cruikshank).
But see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 148-85 (1988) (characterizing various decisions by the
Waite Court as moderate and balanced); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Re-
construction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 63 ("[Wlhat is remarkable is the
degree to which the [Waite] Court sustained national authority to protect rights rather than
the degree to which [it] restricted it."); Earl M. Maltz, The Waite Court and Federal Power to
Enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR 75,
80-81 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1996) (stating that "to describe the analysis of the Waite Court
as unremittingly conservative would be a mistake" and arguing that the Court's "jury dis-
crimination and voting rights cases reflect sympathy for the major elements of the Republi-
can theory of federal power"). Cf. Randall Kennedy, Reconstruction, the Waite Court and the
Politics of History, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIVIL WAR, supra, at 99, 102 (noting
the revisionist argument that "far from betraying the political values of the Republicans who
fashioned the Reconstruction Amendments, the Waite Court Justices rather faithfully
mirrored those values"); infra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
37. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
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United States v. Harris,39 and the Civil Rights Cases4° undeniably
restricted congressional power to enforce the newly ratified Recon-
struction-era Amendments. And yet, the Waite Court's resistance
to congressional reconstruction was not steadfast. As Reese and
Cruikshank make clear, the Waite Court did not hesitate to overturn
federal convictions and invalidate congressional enforcement legisla-
tion. But even as it did so, the Waite Court left open opportunities for
the exercise of broad congressional power to reach deeply into local
affairs to block efforts meant to curb or eliminate black-voting
strength.
At issue in United States v. Reese were federal indictments charging
two municipal-election inspectors with violating sections 3 and 4 of the
Enforcement Act of 1870.a" The indictments alleged that the inspec-
tors refused to accept payment of a poll tax proffered by an otherwise
qualified black voter "because of [his] race.' 42 Chief Justice Waite's
majority opinion construes sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act to
transcend race-based denials of the vote and to encompass wrongful
denials of the vote more generally. 3 Based on this interpretation,
Reese holds that the statutory provisions exceeded Congress's
enforcement power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment."
"Congress can interfere" in state elections, Reese states, only when a
State "wrongful[ly] refus[es] to receive the vote of a qualified elec-
tor .... because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."45
38. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
39. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
40. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
41. In relevant part, section 3 provides that "the offer" of a citizen to carry out a state-
mandated prerequisite to voting "be deemed and held as performance in law of such act" if
the offer "fail[s] to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission afore-
said of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such perform-
ance" and establishes a federal criminal offense for "any judge, inspector, or other officer of
election.., wrongfully [to] refuse or omit to receive, count, certify, register, report, or give
effect to the vote of such citizen."
Section 4, in relevant part, establishes a criminal offense for "any person, by force, brib-
ery, threats, intimidation, or other unlawful means... [to] hinder, delay, prevent, or ob-
struct, or... [to] combine and confederate with others to [do the same], any citizen from
doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting at an election as
aforesaid." Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36, 37
(1894).
42. Reese, 92 U.S. at 216. See generally 2 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
REUNION, 1864-1888, at 229-30 (1987); ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND
BLACK SUFFRAGE: LOSING THE VOTE IN REESE AND CRUIKSHANK 65-67 (2001).
43. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 218, 220.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 218.
2348 [Vol. 101:2341
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United States v. Cruikshan' 6 upholds the release of three white
men convicted under section 6 of the 1870 Act 47 for their participation
in the Grant Parish Massacre. Following the contested gubernatorial
election in Louisiana in 1872, and the parallel governments it
produced, a group of black Republicans assembled in Colfax to defend
Republican control of the Grant Parish seat. On April 13, 1873, fight-
ing broke out between these forces and white Democrats from the
countryside. Two white men and dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of
black men died. Many of the black men were killed after they surren-
dered to the white forces.48 Federal prosecutors indicted ninety-nine of
the white men involved, prosecuted nine, and obtained convictions
against three. The trial judges, Circuit Judge Woods and Associate
Justice Bradley, disagreed over the legality of the convictions, result-
ing in that court granting the defendant's motion to arrest judgment.4 9
Cruikshank holds that the indictments failed to charge an interfer-
ence with "any right or privilege granted or secured" by the Constitu-
tion, as required by section 6. According to Chief Justice Waite's
opinion for the Court, charges alleging interference with the victims'
voting rights fell short because the indictments did not assert racial
motivation." Alleged deprivations of due process and equal protection
failed because those Fourteenth Amendment guarantees did not "add
any thing [sic] to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitu-
tion against another."51 Alleged denials of the right to assemble and
the right to bear arms were deficient because the Constitution guaran-
46. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
47. Section 6 of the 1870 Act provides:
That if two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon the pub-
lic highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provisions of this act,
or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such per-
sons shall be held guilty of felony ....
Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 114, § 6, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241
(2000)).
48. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 530 (1st ed. 1988) (describing the massacre as the "bloodiest single act of carnage in
all of Reconstruction"); GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 42-50; ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI,
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 175 (1985); TED TUNNELL, CRUCIBLE OF
RECONSTRUCTION: WAR, RADICALISM, AND RACE IN LOUISIANA 1862-1877, at 189-92
(1984); XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY 135-37 (1997).
49. See United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 708 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897).
50. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876) (noting that "[w]e may sus-
pect that race was the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred").
51. Id. at 554-55.
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teed those rights only against congressional encroachment. 2 Other
counts were simply too vague.53
According to scholars of divergent viewpoints, Reese and Cruik-
shank thwarted federal power to protect the southern black popula-
tion and facilitated the end of Reconstruction. 4 The two decisions,
52. Id. at 552-53.
53. Id. at 557-58.
54. See, e.g., KEITH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY 15 n.15 (1998) (stating that Reese
and Cruikshank "gutted the enforcement acts"); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 179-80 (1986) (de-
scribing Cruikshank as holding that "the government could do nothing about a politically
motivated armed attack by whites that killed sixty blacks" and that Reese "seriously re-
strict[ed] the power of Congress to protect blacks under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments"); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 330-31 (3d ed. 1967)
(arguing that Reese and Cruikshank "hasten[ed] the end of Reconstruction"); WILLIAM
GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 1869-79, at 295 (1979) (stating that Reese
"made future enforcement vastly more difficult, and in some cases clearly impossible");
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 36, at 488-89; ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 90-91
(citing Reese and Cruikshank as decisions that "eviscerated various federal protections of
black voting rights" and thus as evidence of the Court's "pivotal role" in disenfranchise-
ment); KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 217; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 60-61
(1975) (stating that Reese "made the federal guarantee of the right to vote all but worthless"
and that Cruikshank "doubled the strength of the Court's blow"); KOUSSER, supra note 1, at
49-50 (citing Reese and Cruikshank as evidence of the Supreme Court's "poten[cy] in pro-
tecting white supremacy in the late nineteenth century"); C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON
R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 132 (1963) (noting that Reese and Cruikshank
"arrang[ed] one of the essential conditions for North-South reconciliation: the ending of
meaningful political participation by the Negro" and made "clear that the Supreme Court
regarded the Reconstruction era as over"); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE 638
(3d ed. 2001) (stating that "[tihe effect of the Reese and Cruikshank decisions, combined
with the Northern loss of will to carry out reconstruction, was to inhibit further enforcement
efforts"); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE NEGRO 109-14, 150-54 (1966) (describing Reese and Cruikshank
as damaging to black rights); TUNNELL, supra note 48, at 193 (describing Cruikshank as a
"racist and morally opaque decision [that] reduced the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Force Acts to meaningless verbiage as far as the civil rights of Negroes were concerned"); 3
CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 326-27, 330 (1922)
(stating that Reese and Cruikshank rendered the federal enforcement legislation "almost
wholly ineffective" and characterizing the decisions as "most fortunate" for "largely elimi-
nat[ing] from National politics the Negro question"); Cardyn, supra note 1, at 859 (arguing
that Reese and Cruikshank "confirmed that the Court was not only determined to avoid con-
fronting squarely the problem of klan violence, but also to downplay those aspects of the
legislative history of early civil-rights law that were inconsistent with its vision of dual feder-
alism"); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST.
COMMENT. 115, 134 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional
Moment] (describing Reese and Cruikshank as "major steps toward dismantling the federal
power to enforce Reconstruction"); Everette Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment,
28 J. S. HIST. 202, 209 (1962) (stating that "[t]he effect of [Reese and Cruikshank] was to
bring to a close the active policy of the government to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.").
But see GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 100, 106 (arguing that Reese and Cruikshank reflect
"moderation in regard to the relationship between the federal government and the states,"
that Reese accepted neither the "strong nationalist position ... [nor] extreme states' rights
constitutionalism," and that Cruikshank "was even more narrow in its result than Reese");
Benedict, supra note 36, at 69, 72-74 (describing Reese and Cruikshank to be among deci-
sions in "which the Supreme Court tried to sustain national authority to protect individual
rights directly without permitting precedents that might later destroy the established limits
between State and national power"); Maltz, supra note 36, at 77, 80 (arguing that Reese
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Charles Warren wrote, rendered "the Federal statutes almost wholly
ineffective to protect the Negro,"5 and "entirely demolished the
Radical Reconstructionist plan of protecting the rights of the negro by
direct Federal legislation."56 John Braeman called Reese "a death blow
to the already faltering efforts to prosecute voting rights violations."57
Eric Foner described Cruikshank as "[e]ven more devastating" than
the Slaughter-House Cases, rendering "national prosecution of crimes
committed against blacks virtually impossible, and g[iving] a green
light to acts of terror where local officials either could not or would
not enforce the law. 58
Reese and Cruikshank indisputably hindered ongoing federal
efforts to enforce the newly ratified Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.59 To be sure, neither decision precluded future federal
iirosecutions under a new statute or a properly crafted indictment.'
But even a Court steadfastly opposed to Reconstruction might have
thought political expediency counseled against wholesale invalidation
of the statutes.61 Both Reese and Cruikshank comport with such
a stance. They dismiss federal indictments at a time when political
support for federal intervention in the South was waning. They
preserve opportunities for future congressional action of the sort the
Court knew full well Congress would not pursue.62 Absent Reese and
forged a middle ground that "avoided the political consequences of upholding the prosecu-
tion, while preserving the possibility that a future Congress could intervene on behalf of
African-American voters if political circumstances changed" and that Cruikshank "strongly
reaffirmed the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from interfering
with preexisting fundamental rights").
55. 3 WARREN, supra note 54, at 326.
56. Id. at 324; see also id. at 326-27 (stating that all but the most radical viewed the deci-
sions "to be wise and to open the door for more sane and liberal methods of dealing with the
negro problem in the South").
57. JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD COURT AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 66 (1988).
58. FONER, supra note 48, at 531.
59. See WANG, supra note 48, at 130 (stating Reese and Cruikshank "clearly jeopardized
and discouraged enforcement"); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 100 (noting that "Cruikshank
and related cases ... made federal prosecutions of violent white supremacists considerably
more difficult to sustain"); Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212, 218 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1970) (noting that Reese and Cruikshank "frustrated federal efforts to bring prosecutions for
interferences with the Negro's right to vote").
60. See Benedict, supra note 36, at 73.
61. See, e.g., Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers,
supra note 20, at 1163 (noting that a series of congressional proposals during the late 1860s
sought to impose supermajority requirements on Supreme Court adjudication and thereby
limit the Court's ability to invalidate federal legislation).
62. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 402 (1985); FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 278 (noting that after Reese,
"Congress would not mend the statute in accord with the Court's instruction"); GILLETTE,
supra note 54, at 298 (arguing that Reese and Cruikshank "served to rationalize and legiti-
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Cruikshank, other branches of the federal government would have
curbed vigorous federal enforcement actions.6 3 Through these opin-
ions, the Court facilitated this withdrawal by providing a semblance of
legal justification as support for prevailing political sentiments.' As
Professor Currie has explained, "the Court went out of its way to
incapacitate the enforcement authorities after it was too late politically
to expect Congress to fill the gap by enacting narrower statutes., 65
Reese, moreover, set free defendants who the Court recognized
violated the Constitution. It did so based on a strained reading of the
statute that forced the Court unnecessarily to confront a constitutional
question.66 The first section of the 1870 Act recognized a right to be
free of racial discrimination in voting, providing that citizens otherwise
qualified to vote "shall be entitled and allowed to vote.., without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 67
Sections 3 and 4 described statutory offenses based on the wrongful
conduct "aforesaid., 68 The statute, accordingly, could have been read
mize the earlier retreat during the decisive 1870s when unfavorable public opinion, local
sabotage, and federal inaction had achieved the overthrow of reconstruction"); WANG,
supra note 48, at 131; Maltz, supra note 36, at 77 (stating that aggressive federal enforcement
efforts were unlikely after Republican electoral defeats in 1874); McConnell, The Forgotten
Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 ("[Tlhe practical effect [of Reese] was to undo
a major underpinning of Reconstruction. The supposed defect in the statute could be easily
remedied, but by 1876 it no longer would be .... ); see also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at
208 (arguing that the Grant administration wanted to abandon "the civil rights enforcement
efforts that had become so politically debilitating" and thus limited its appeal in Cruikshank
to voting issues so that "[tihe Justice Department could withdraw gracefully from an unde-
sirable policy under the semblance of a judicial mandate").
63. See GILLETTE, supra note 54, at 299; KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 208;
MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 130 ("Cruikshank and Reese would have provoked outraged
howls in the 1860's; in 1876 Congress accepted them with the mildest of taps on the Court's
wrist."); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436 (4th ed. 2001) ("At the
same time that the Court was dismantling much of the Reconstruction legislation, the politi-
cal coalition behind Reconstruction was also collapsing."); Maltz, supra note 36, at 77.
64. MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 133 (noting that the Court "marched in step with the
national mood").
65. CURRIE, supra note 62, at 402.
66. While the modern articulation of the canon of avoiding constitutional questions is
found in United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909), the doctrine itself originated much earlier. See, e.g, Murray v. The Schooner Charm-
ing Betty, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12
(1800).
67. In full, section 1 provided:
That all citizens of the United States who are or shall be otherwise qualified by law to vote at
any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, parish, township,
school district, municipality, or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to
vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude; any constitution, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or Territory, or by or
under its authority, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 1, 16 Stat. 140, 140.
68. See supra note 41.
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to establish a criminal offense, an element of which was a denial of the
vote based on a "distinction of race," and not more broadly any
wrongful denial of the vote.69 The Court held otherwise only by disre-
garding the statute's legislative history," and the interpretative canons
both that penal statutes be strictly construed7 and that all statutes be
construed to preserve their validity. 2 At a minimum, the Court's view
that the defendants had blocked a voter based on a "distinction of
race" and thus that statutory provisions were constitutional as applied
to the defendants should have counseled against invalidating the
statute in its entirety.73
Cruikshank, too, opined on constitutional issues the Court might
have avoided.74 The Grant administration presented the Court with a
narrow challenge to the lower-court ruling dismissing the indictments,
taking issue only with the deficiency found in the charges alleging
interference with the victims' voting rights. The defendants filed a
69. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 241-45 (1876) (Hunt, J., dissenting); see also
FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 278 (describing as "regrettable" that the Court did not agree
with Justice Hunt, and stating that, under the statute, "[n]o person accused would be taken
unawares"); MAGRATH, supra note 54, at 129 (describing Justice Hunt's dissent as forceful);
Maltz, supra note 36, at 76 (describing Waite's reading as "questionable at best").
70. See Reese, 92 U.S. at 241 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (stating that congressional intent that
the Act protected newly enfranchised black voters from racial discrimination "is too plain to
be discussed"); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Sherman)
(noting that the statute contains "no provision.., but what is intended simply to prevent a
discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" and that the use
of "aforesaid" in section 4 "shows clearly enough that the intention of its framers was to con-
fine the operation of that section to offenses against the fifteenth amendment"); FAIRMAN,
supra note 42, at 231, 235 n.55, 250 (noting that the legislative history "would not sustain"
the claim that sections 3 and 4 transcended race); Maltz, supra note 36, at 76-77 (stating that
the debates on the 1870 Act indicate that the statute proscribed only racially motivated acts).
71. Cf. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (noting rule that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which
its application might be unconstitutional").
72. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 402 (stating that the Court "manipulat[ed] the statu-
tory issues of coverage and severability"); McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment,
supra note 54, at 134 (describing Reese's "reasoning" as "transparently faulty").
73. THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 180-81 (1868); CURRIE, supra
note 62, at 395 n.175 (arguing that "[a]s an original matter of statutory interpretation, it
would seem odd to conclude that a Congress legislating to protect voting rights would rather
have no statute at all than a statute limited to offenses based on race" (citing Robert L.
Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REV. 76, 99
(1937)); McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 n.64; cf
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progres-
sive Era: Part 3: Black Disfranchisement from the KKK to the Grandfather Clause, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 835, 840 n.12 (1982) (arguing that the Court's refusal to limit the statute by
construction to racially motivated offenses "was certainly defensible").
74. See generally William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 832 n.4 (2001).
75. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)
(No. 609) (stating that "we will confine ourselves to the 14th and 16th counts" of the indict-
ment), reprinted in 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
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comprehensive brief arguing that each count of the indictment was
inadequate.76 In response the Waite Court issued its sweeping exegesis
not just on the voting counts but also on a host of other issues, includ-
ing equal protection, due process, and incorporation.77
Cruikshank launched the Waite Court's constriction of Congress's
enforcement powers under the newly ratified Reconstruction-era
Amendments.78 Cruikshank asserts that the Equal Protection Clause
governs state action alone and suggests that Congress may not regu-
late private action pursuant to its enforcement powers. Chief Justice
Waite's opinion states that "[tihe only obligation resting upon the
United States is to see that the States do not deny the right .... The
power of the national government is limited to enforcement of this
guaranty."79 While arguably dictum in Cruikshank, ° the Waite Court
gave this suggestion precedential effect in United States v. Harris8 and
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287, 290 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]; see also FAIRMAN,
supra note 42, at 274 (noting that Cruikshank "was not confined to the counts on which the
Government had rested" and characterizing the result as "wise, in order that the opinion
might be more instructive"); ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 84 (1960)
(stating that Cruikshank "went far beyond the necessities of the case to give a very narrow
construction of the due process and equal protection clauses").
76. Brief for Defendants, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (No. 609),
reprinted in 7 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 75, at 347.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
78. The Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Reconstruction-era Amendments
and the congressional legislation enforcing them predates the Waite Court. See, e.g., The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873) (denying that the Fourteenth
Amendment "radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal
governments to each other"); Bylew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872) (holding
that a black murder victim was not "affect[ed]" by the prosecution of white defendants
charged with the killing, and hence that the case was not entitled to removal to federal court
under § 3 of the Civil Rights Act).
79. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 555.
80. Sections 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act prohibited interference only with rights "granted or
secured" by the Constitution and as such arguably did not proscribe private conduct, at least
in connection with claimed denials of equal protection and due process. See CURRIE, supra
note 62, at 396 & n.184 (arguing that "Congress had forbidden only violations of the Consti-
tution" and that the statutory formulation was "properly broad enough to allow Congress to
see to it that private persons do not induce or assist the state in denying fourteenth amend-
ment rights" but did not extend to purely private action); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1377-
78 (1964) (asserting that Cruikshank "does not say, nor does it clearly imply that Congress
has no power to impose new duties on private individuals"); Maltz, supra note 36, at 79
(stating that the Cruikshank Court "had been careful to leave open the question of whether
Congress possessed broad authority to regulate private racially motivated activity"); cf.
McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 135 (arguing that Cruik-
shank rests on the proposition that private persons cannot violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and "[t]hus, the federal government had no power to protect against the private vio-
lence that was the principal means by which white Democrats sought to nullify the
protections of the law").
81. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
June 2003] Reinforcing Representation 2355
the Civil Rights Cases.82 These latter decisions do not categorically bar
Congress from reaching private action in this realm,83 but, in notable
contravention of the Framers' intent,' significantly narrow the
contexts in which such action may be pursued.
These characteristics notwithstanding, Reese and Cruikshank are
more narrow, and indeed less damaging to the First Reconstruction,
than the prevailing critique suggests.' With regard to blocking racial
82. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
83. See Harris, 106 U.S. at 639 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "imposes no
duty and confers no power upon Congress" to act where state laws, as enacted, construed
and enforced, "recognize and protect the rights of all persons"); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 14 (stating that the contested law was not "corrective of any constitutional wrong
committed by the States" and was not based on "any supposed or apprehended violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States"); 3 WARREN, supra note 54, at 339
(stating that under Section 5, "Congress may, within bounds, provide the modes of redress
against individuals when a State has violated the prohibitions [of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment]"); Benedict, supra note 36, at 66-67 (arguing that Cruikshank and the Civil
Rights Cases "never rejected absolutely and without cavil" congressional power to protect
rights violated by state inaction); Frantz, supra note 80, at 1377-81 (arguing that Cruikshank,
Harris, and the Civil Rights Cases do not adopt "the extreme view that congressional en-
forcement power never extends to 'private acts' "); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 476. But
cf Maltz, supra note 36, at 79 (arguing that Cruikshank and Harris "had been careful to
leave open the question of whether Congress possess [sic] broad authority to regulate pri-
vate, racially motivated activity" and that the Civil Rights Cases "largely foreclosed this pos-
sibility").
Language in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), suggests that the Court there
read Harris and the Civil Rights Cases as establishing this categorical rule, see Morrison, 529
U.S. at 620-21, and that Morrison purported to apply it. Id. at 626 (noting that VAWA "is
not directed at any State or state actor, but at individuals"); see Evan H. Caminker, Private
Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2000)
[hereinafter Caminker, Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5] (arguing that Morrison
affirms private remediation "is a per se inappropriate means of Section 5 enforcement").
Even so, the Court's observation that Congress's findings did not support nationwide appli-
cation of the statute, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626-27, undercuts its suggestion that Congress
may never reach private action pursuant to its Section 5 powers. See Caminker, supra, at
1359-72 (arguing that Morrison errs and that private remediation for unconstitutional state
action can comport with the constitutional text, Supreme Court precedent, and principles of
federalism); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 443, 445 (finding unclear "whether and to what
extent" Section 5 legislation may regulate private conduct and rejecting contention that
Morrison establishes a per se ban on such regulation).
84. See CURRIE, supra note 62, at 397 (noting that "[a] strong argument can be made, on
the basis of the origins of the equal protection clause, that private lynching was among the
evils that Congress was meant to have power to forbid"); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 162-
63 (1950) (arguing that the view the Fourteenth Amendment "ha[s] no bearing upon dis-
criminatory acts by private persons .... was so totally foreign to the conceptions of those
who passed the Amendment that no real assessment of it can be made in terms of recon-
struction attitudes"); Frantz, supra note 80, at 1357 ("Congress believed it possessed...
power to protect the newly-freed Negro from private aggression .... ); Gressman, supra
note 36, at 1340 (arguing that "[iut was private action, not state action, that had caused so
much of the post-war bloodshed and atrocities in the South").
85. See GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 100, 109; Benedict, supra note 36, at 71-75 (dis-
cussing ways in which both decisions authorize broad federal power to protect individual
rights); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 100 (arguing that Waite Court critics "oversimplif[y] by
exaggerating the extent to which the Waite Court hobbled federal efforts to protect blacks
and neglecting the extent to which certain Waite Court rulings extended protection to blacks
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discrimination in voting in particular, both Reese and Cruikshank sug-
gest that the Waite Court thought Congress enjoys considerably more
power than it possesses in other realms. 6 To be sure, Reese holds that
the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits race-based discrimination in'
voting and permits Congress to proscribe only similarly motivated
acts. This suggests that "appropriate" federal legislation in this realm
must require proof of racially discriminatory intent.s7 When viewed
through the lens of contemporary doctrine, the implication is that
Congress may not proscribe facially race-neutral conduct for which
racial animus is the likely motivation.8 More generally, Reese implies
that Congress may not proscribe constitutional conduct even where it
deems such proscriptions necessary to remedy a constitutional viola-
tion. 9
The Waite Court was not, however, committed to this proposition,
as Cruikshank and Reese themselves indicate. Reese strikes down the
statutory provisions because the Court understood them to proscribe
wrongful conduct that denied the vote for reasons wholly unrelated to
race and accordingly unrelated to conduct violating the Fifteenth
Amendment.' The United States' brief in the Supreme Court stated
in circumstances that would have plausibly allowed for a different outcome"); Maltz, supra
note 36, at 81 (arguing that the Waite Court's voting and jury cases "reflect sympathy for
major elements of the Republican theory of federal power"); see also CURRIE, supra note
62, at 402 (rejecting as too extreme the critique that the Waite Court undermined Congress's
enforcement powers and "abandon[ed] blacks to the mercies of Southern hostility");
KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 213 (arguing that Reese "implicitly reject[s] the defense's
narrow interpretation of state action").
86. See GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 106 (noting that "[b]oth decisions agreed that the
Fifteenth Amendment did protect citizens from voter discrimination based on race ... [and
both] clearly and explicitly confirmed congressional authority to protect that right from dis-
crimination based on race"); WANG, supra note 48, at 132 (arguing that Reese and Cruik-
shank preserved the federal government's "power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment"
and both agreed that "Congress had the power to protect ... the right to be exempt from
voting discrimination on account of race").
87. Cf McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, supra note 54, at 134 (sug-
gesting that insofar as the statutory provisions in Reese applied "to denials of the right to
vote on grounds other than race," they "exceeded" Congress's powers under Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment).
88. Nearly a century later, the Court would reject this suggestion by upholding congres-
sional power to proscribe seemingly race-neutral electoral practices for which Congress sus-
pects racially discriminatory intent is the motivation. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); see also CURRIE, supra note 62, at 393-
94 (noting that while Reese's conclusion that the congressional enforcement power extends
only to racially motivated electoral practices "seems obvious from the language and evident
purpose of the enforcement provision," the principle requires "some qualification to prevent
evasion").
89. See Caminker, Remedies for Public Wrongs Under Section 5, supra note 83, at 1362
(distinguishing permissible means from permissible ends of Section 5 legislation).
90. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1876); see also FAIRMAN, supra note
42, at 249 (suggesting that the Court held the statute to be "inappropriate" legislation be-
cause it understood it to target conduct regarding which "there was no design to thwart the
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment"); Warren, supra note 59, at 219 (stating that
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that the statute transcended race-based denials of the vote, notwith-
standing evidence that Congress meant for the proscription to block
only racially motivated conduct.91 The Solicitor General wrote that the
statutory provisions prohibited "unlawful hindrances... upon any
account and by any person," and accordingly "have a much wider ap-
plication than is needed for the case before us. '9 2 The Court accepted
this construction and thus did not address whether Congress had
power to proscribe race-neutral conduct in order to block race-based
discrimination in voting.
Reese and Cruikshank moreover decline to resolve whether
Congress may more easily proscribe private, and thus constitutional,
conduct pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment than it may under the Fourteenth. Reese invalidates sec-
tions 3 and 4 of the 1870 Act for failing to require racial motivation,
stating that "Congress can interfere" in state elections only when a
State "wrongful[ly] refus[es] to receive the vote of a qualified elec-
tor .... because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."93
So too, Cruikshank dismisses indictment counts pertaining to voting
because the indictment counts alleging interference with the victims'
voting rights did not assert a racial motivation.94 In so doing, neither
decision suggests any constitutional infirmity stemming from the
application of the relevant statutes to purely private conduct in con-
nection with voting.
To be sure, this omission may reflect nothing more than that the
Court had already dispensed with the voting claims on intent grounds
Reese "did not take from Congress the power to legislative against racially motivated inter-
ferences with the right to vote").
91. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
92. See Brief for the United States at 29, United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (No.
145); see also FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 237 (arguing that the government's brief in Reese
"was working in effect against the possibility that the Court might read [the statute] more
narrowly and, so construed, sustain it"); GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 79.
93. Reese, 92 U.S. at 218.
94. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1875) (noting that "[w]e may sus-
pect that race was the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred").
95. See BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 65, 68; Benedict, supra note 36, at 72; Maltz, supra
note 36, at 79. But see HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 36, at 489 (reading Reese and Cruik-
shank as placing the Court "well on a state-action-only path of interpretation");
MCPHERSON, supra note 54, at 638 (reading Reese and Cruikshank as "narrow[ing] the
scope of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments" and establishing that the Amendments
"empowered Congress to legislate only against discrimination by states"); TUNNELL, supra
note 48, at 193 (reading Cruikshank to hold that "because a private army and not the State
of Louisiana committed the massacre, the federal government was powerless to act");
Schmidt, supra note 73, at 840 n.14 (arguing that Cruikshank rested on state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment and had clear implications for federal power to protect black voters
from private violence under the Fifteenth, given that it too was directed at the States).
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and thus was not required to address state action as well.96 It certainly
falls short of affirmatively establishing federal power to proscribe
private conduct.9 7 Still, the Court's refusal to pass on the question of
private action suggests a receptivity to congressional power in this
realm incompatible with steadfast opposition to Reconstruction. The
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments both proscribe state action.98
But in his circuit court decision in Cruikshank,99 Justice Bradley
expressly distinguished the two Amendments on state action
grounds."° The lower court in Reese split on whether Congress could
punish private individuals who interfered with voting rights secured by
the Fifteenth Amendment. 1 Counsel for the defendants in both Reese
and Cruikshank challenged congressional power to reach private
action under the Fifteenth Amendment. 2 And yet, in both cases, the
Court opted to resolve the voting claims on intent grounds, even
96. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 62, at 395-96 n.182 (rejecting reading Reese and Cruik-
shank to embrace congressional power to reach private conduct under the Fifteenth
Amendment because it "seems to confuse deciding with refusing to decide"); Sarah B. Law-
sky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE
L.J. 783, 805-06 n.142 (2000) (stating that "[t]o conclude that there is no state action re-
quirement for the Fifteenth Amendment because the Court chose different grounds on
which to invalidate the statutes in question seems an unwarranted leap - an extraordinarily
strong version of expressio unius est exclusio alterius").
97. See JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 103 (1909) (noting that Cruikshank "neither affirmed nor denied
Bradley's opinion that the Amendment inhibits the acts of private individuals"). But see
BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 68 (stating that "[d]icta in Cruikshank and Reese had upheld
the power of Congress to reach racially motivated violations of voting rights - whether pri-
vately or official done - in state and local elections"); Benedict, supra note 36, at 72 (argu-
ing that Reese and Cruikshank "endorsed Bradley's expansive view of congressional author-
ity to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment against individual infringements of the rights to
vote... [and] agree[d] that Congress could punish private offenses against citizens' voting
rights so long as they were motivated by race or previous condition of servitude"); see also
Maltz, supra note 36, at 85 (finding support in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), for
this same proposition). For evidence that at least some of the Justices understood Congress
to possess this power, see United States v. Butler, 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D. S.C. 1877) (No.
14,700) (opinion of Waite, C.J.); United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 712-13 (C.C.D.
La. 1874) (No. 14,897) (opinion of Bradley, J.).
98. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1
("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
99. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
100. Id. at 712-13 (stating that, in contrast to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth
Amendment created "a positive right" and conferred on Congress "the power to secure that
right not only as against the unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence,
and combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state laws").
For a discussion of Justice Bradley's opinion, see GOLDMAN, supra note 42, at 55-57;
KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 182-83; WANG, supra note 48, at 126-27; Benedict, supra
note 36, at 71-74; Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley's Civil Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1979, 1992-95 (1996).
101. See KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48, at 202.
102. See id.
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though Cruikshank relied on state action to dismiss the Fourteenth
Amendment counts.1°3 Both cases squarely presented the Court with
the question whether Congress can reach private action under the
Fifteenth Amendment and in both cases the Court declined to resolve
it.104
Reese's analysis of section 3 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 also
suggests that the Waite Court thought that Congress enjoys notably
broad power to remedy Fifteenth Amendment violations. Section 3
provided that a citizen's offer to perform a state-mandated prerequi-
site to voting shall "be deemed and held as a performance in law of
such act" insofar as the offer "fail[s] to be carried into execution by
reason of the wrongful act or omission aforesaid" of the person
charged with giving it effect. 5 As Reese explains, the provision
effected a dramatic change in state electoral practice. Not only had
Congress prescribed electoral rules "not provided by the laws of the
States," but the Act "substitutes, under certain circumstances,
performance wrongfully prevented for performance itself.""° In the
circumstances described, state-voting inspectors were required to treat
the citizen's submission of attempted compliance "as the equivalent of
the specified requirement."'" In other words, Congress had assumed
for itself the institutional role of state-election inspector, implement-
ing by force of law the rules of decision it had prescribed for state elec-
tions and binding other state actors to honor the results.
Reese, of course, strikes down this statutory provision as unconsti-
tutional. But it does so because the Court perceived a lack of clarity as
to what the provision proscribed and not because the remedy
prescribed was deemed to intrude too greatly into state sovereignty.
Reading the statute to apply to wrongful refusals not motivated by
race, or at a minimum to be vague on this point,1"8 Reese states that a
change in practice as "radical" as the one section 3 attempted "should
be explicit in its terms .... The law ought not be in such a condition
that the elector may act upon one idea of its meaning, and the inspec-
103. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1876).
104. The Court affirmatively held that Congress lacked the power to reach private ac-
tion under the Fifteenth Amendment in James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903). Cf Voting
Rights Act § 11(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(i)(b) (2000) (barring any person "whether acting under
color of law or otherwise" from intimidating actual or prospective voters); Nipper v. Smith,
39 F.3d 1494, 1549 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (stating that the
constitutionality of § 11(b) is "questionable"); United States v. Harvey, 250 F. Supp. 219
(D.C. La. 1966) (invalidating application of § 11(b) to landlords who evicted black tenants
who had registered to vote).
105. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 3, 4, 16 Stat. 140-41, repealed by 28 Stat. 36, 37
(1894).
106. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214,219 (1876).
107. Id.
108. id. at 219-20.
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tor upon another." ' 9 Reese thus asserts that the statute provided
inspectors and voters alike insufficient guidance regarding the scope of
its proscription. Had the statute more explicitly limited the triggering
state action to racially motivated conduct, Reese implies that Congress
could constitutionally have assumed the institutional role set forth in
section 3, that is, Congress could "substitute[] ... performance wrong-
fully prevented for performance itself."10
Reese does not hold that Congress may assume this role any more
than Reese and Cruikshank establish definitively that Congress can '
broadly reach private action when acting to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment's proscription on race-based discrimination in voting.
Instead, both decisions set forth narrow legal holdings that carefully
leave open the possibility that Congress possesses such broad and
intrusive power. The Court's willingness to leave this possibility open
is noteworthy, particularly given the lack of restraint displayed else-
where in the same opinions. The Court's refusal to foreclose these op-
portunities for congressional action temper the charge that Reese and
Cruikshank evince the Court's determination to end Reconstruction
and "protect[] white supremacy......
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT AND CONGRESS'S ENFORCEMENT
POWERS
Like those of the Waite Court, decisions of the Rehnquist Court
circumscribe Congress's authority to frame antidiscrimination
measures pursuant to the Reconstruction-era Amendments. They
nevertheless accord Congress significant deference when it acts to
address racial discrimination in voting. This Part identifies this defer-
ence in City of Boerne v. Flores"2 and its progeny."3 The Boerne deci-
sions significantly limit Congress's enforcement powers," 4 but never-
theless preserve seemingly contrary precedent upholding provisions of
the Voting Rights Act ("VRA") against constitutional challenge. This
Part then argues that this deference may be reconciled with the seem-
109. Id. at 219; cf KACZOROWSKI, supra note 48.
110. Reese, 92 U.S. at 219. But see Schmidt, supra note 73, at 840 n.12 (arguing that this
language from Reese "reveal[s] a general hostility to federal intervention in state elec-
tions.").
111. KOUSSER, supra note 1, at 49-50; see also supra note 54.
112. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
113. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003); Bd. of Trs. of
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
114. Hibbs is the exception. See supra note 12.
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ing antipathy several recent voting-rights decisions display toward the
VRA and Congress.
A. The Boerne Decisions and the VRA Precedent
City of Boerne v. Flores announced the now familiar requirement
that congressional legislation enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments
must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' ' 15 In four
years, six federal statutes fell under this standard, notwithstanding the
nominally "wide latitude"'1 6 the Court maintains Congress enjoys in
framing enforcement legislation.'17 Applying rigorous review, the Court
has deemed linkages between statutory proscriptions and constitutional
injuries too attenuated, statutory remedies too broad, and underlying
congressional findings too skimpy to render various statutory provisions
valid exercises of Congress's enforcement power.
Elements of the Boerne decisions offer support for the view that
the Rehnquist Court is hostile to the Second Reconstruction and that
it engages in "conservative activism" to dismantle it."' Nearly all of
115. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
116. Id.
117. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating abroga-
tion of state immunity in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating § 13981 of VAWA); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating attempted abrogation of state immunity in the
ADEA); Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (invalidating attempted abrogation of state immunity in the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (invalidating abrogation of state immunity in the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act); Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") as applied to state and local action).
118. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 98-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (stating that "[tihe kind of judicial activism manifested" in various federalism cases
including the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank decisions "represents such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the oppor-
tunity arises"); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1054; Judith Olans Brown & Peter D.
Enrich, Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1-2, 40 (2000) (describing feder-
alism decisions as "signal[ing] a newly activist role for the courts in patrolling the boundaries
of federal authority" and the Boerne doctrine, as applied in Kimel, as embodying a "radical
restriction on congressional power to determine its own agenda in matters pertaining to in-
dividual rights"); Chemerinsky, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is a Constitutional
Expansion of Rights, supra note 4, at 602 (describing Boerne as displaying "conservative ju-
dicial activism"); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80,
87 (2001) (arguing that decisions like Kimel and Morrison embody "judicial activism in
which disrespect for Congress is a fundamental element"); Douglas Laycock, The Supreme
Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 39-40 (2000) (drawing parallels between
Boerne and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)); Cass Sunstein, A Hand in the Matter,
LEGAL AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 27-28 (suggesting that in striking down portions of the
ADA, ADEA, and VAWA, "[t]he Rehnquist Court has been engaged in right-wing judicial
activism"). But see Marci A. Hamilton, Nine Shibboleths of the New Federalism, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 931, 932 (2001) (arguing that Boerne "is far from being wildly activist").
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these decisions diminish the scope of federal regulation by invalidating
federal statutes and circumscribing congressional power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne eliminated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act's ("RFRA") broad application to virtually all types of
state and local governmental decisions."9 Florida Prepaid, College
Savings Bank, Kimel, and Garrett shield states from potential financial
liability and the dignitary affront said to accompany the abrogation of
state immunity that Congress had attempted."' 0 Morrison ensured
exclusivity of state power in a realm in which VAWA sought to
provide a supplemental federal remedy.121 Boerne, Kimel, Morrison,
and Garrett all strike down statutes that may aptly be deemed antidis-
crimination or civil-rights measures of the type thought to constitute
the core of the Second Reconstruction.' And while Hibbs seems to
break this trend by upholding the Family Medical Leave Act, it does
so without casting doubt on the doctrinal validity of the preceding
Boerne cases.'23
As a group, the Boerne cases announce new principles defining
congressional power that appear inconsistent with precedent and
historical understandings of the scope of that power. 24 Boerne holds
that Congress lacks authority to engage in independent constitutional
interpretation and that its Section 5 power is limited to remedying
119. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and
Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 79, 105-06 (describing
RFRA's breadth of application); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 9-10 (1998) (same).
120. Cf Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, 1999
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 52-56 [hereinafter Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Fed-
eralism] (criticizing the view that state dignitary interests justify sovereign immunity, and
stating that "[ilt is simply an extraordinary statement, in our political tradition, to suggest
that any governmental entity has a 'dignity' intrinsically superior to that of the individual.
There are no kings here.").
121. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States
v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 136, 149 (2000) (stating that VAWA "duplicated no
state law in theory, design, or remedy," that it was a law "with federalism-friendly concur-
rent jurisdiction," and that it "provided merely a supplementary civil option while leaving
state criminal remedies in place").
122. Id. at 135; Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 486-502, 513-22.
123. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977-78, 1981-83
(2003); supra note 12; infra note 135.
124. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming of a Co-
ordinate Branch: The Supreme Court in Garrett, 4 GREEN BAG (2d ser.) 351, 354-55 (2001)
(describing the "new-fangled congruence and proportionality test" set forth in the Boerne
decisions and accusing the Court of "making up new rules that Congress could not reasona-
bly have anticipated"); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a
Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 349 (2001) (noting that "Boerne and
its progeny break with the doctrinal frameworks - and institutional understandings -
through which the Court has defined Congress's power to enact civil rights legislation since
the beginning of the second Reconstruction").
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violations of constitutional rights as defined by the Court. 25 This
holding expressly rejects Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion that
Congress may "rachet up" constitutional protections as construed by
the Court,26 and historical evidence indicating that the Framers of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments intended for Congress to have
this authority.'27
As the measure of the "appropriateness" of remedial legislation,
moreover, the congruence-and-proportionality test represents a new
and substantial hurdle that renders congressional action in this realm
inherently suspect, much in the way that use of a racial classification
triggers strict scrutiny.'28 The Court has examined the disputed statutes
125. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) ("Any suggestion that Congress
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported
by our case law.").
126. Id. at 527-28 (noting language in Morgan that "could be interpreted as acknowl-
edging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment" but stating that "[t]his is not a necessary interpretation, how-
ever, or even the best one"); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966);
Shane, supra note 4, at 207 n.37 (arguing that Morgan was no longer good precedent when
Boerne was decided); Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of Federalism, supra
note 120, at 13-14.
127. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 822-23 &
n.292 (1999) (arguing that the Framers intended for Congress to exercise broad enforcement
powers under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and that this power was not lim-
ited to remedial legislation); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 118 (2000) (arguing that
the "Reconstruction Republicans aimed to give Congress broad power to declare and define
the fundamental rights - the privileges and immunities - of American citizens above and
beyond the floor set by courts"); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec-
tion 5 Powers, supra note 20, at 1132 (characterizing as plausible the view that "Section 5 is
best understood as contemplating some participation by Congress in the definition of consti-
tutional norms"); Laycock, supra note 118, at 39 & n.55; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions
and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REV. 153, 195
(1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation](suggesting that Boerne con-
flicts with the Framers' intent); see also Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section
5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 133 (1999) (arguing that Boerne's historical analysis "does not hold up
under scrutiny" and that the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history "do[es] not pro-
vide any support for a narrowing of Congress's power to enforce" the Amendment). But see
Hamilton, supra note 118, at 934-35 (arguing that "[t]he constitutional structure feature that
is enforced in the federalism cases is not inherently at odds with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
128. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 959
(3d ed. 2000); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra
note 20, at 1147 (arguing that Boerne's congruence-and-proportionality test "clearly devi-
ated from the Court's longstanding articulation and application of the more deferential
McCulloch means-ends standard"); Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 91 (noting that "congruence and proportionality
is a demanding standard"); Stephen Gardbaum, The Federalism Implications of Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 682 (1998) (stating that Boerne establishes a "more rigorous"
test for determining whether legislation is appropriate under Section 5); McConnell, Institu-
tions and Interpretation, supra note 127, at 166 (noting congruence and proportionality ele-
vates level of scrutiny applied to Section 5 legislation); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 477
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with considerable rigor and has demanded extensive findings of
underlying unconstitutional conduct to validate congressional
enforcement legislation.1
29
The Boerne decisions establish that Congress cannot rely on either
general assertions or isolated examples of unconstitutional conduct, 3 '
but instead must document a widespread pattern of such conduct by
entities of the precise sort being subject to suit.131 Boerne, Florida
Prepaid, College Savings Bank, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett each
reject as inadequate the findings underlying the disputed statutes on
the grounds that Congress documented too few instances of unconsti-
tutional conduct. 132  Even the sizable record Congress amassed
regarding the inadequacy of state attempts to combat gender-
motivated violence proved insufficient to save VAWA because
(equating congruence and proportionality with narrow tailoring required by strict-scrutiny
analysis).
129. See infra notes 130-135.
130. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001)
(dismissing "unexamined, anecdotal accounts of 'adverse, disparate treatment by state offi-
cials,' " when found outside the formal legislative findings); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000) (rejecting as insufficient "assorted sentences... cobble[d] together
from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates" as either general unsub-
stantiated assertions or isolated anecdotal examples). While the Court has not wholly re-
jected anecdotal evidence suggesting unconstitutional conduct, it has treated such examples
with considerable skepticism and indicated its preference for examples of adjudicated consti-
tutional violations. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
absence of "confirming judicial documentation" in the form of court decisions addressing
unconstitutional discrimination by States against people with disabilities).
131. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (finding that Congress failed "to uncover any signifi-
cant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination," and that it lacked "evidence of widespread
and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States"); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640 (1999) (concluding that "Congress
identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitu-
tional violations"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (noting absence of
evidence documenting "some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this coun-
try"); id. at 526 (noting absence of a "widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional
rights").
132. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370 (finding that the lengthy legislative record docu-
menting employment discrimination against the disabled included few instances of invidious
state activities and noting that even if six specific record examples involving contemporary
state action amounted to unconstitutional discrimination, they "fall far short of even sug-
gesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which §5 legislation must be
based"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (holding record inadequate for failing to identify viola-
tions in every State); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (finding legislative findings underlying the abro-
gation of state immunity in the ADEA so wanting as to render Congress' extension of the
Act to the States "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem"); Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 645-46 ("Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response
to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the Con-
stitution."); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (noting that documented instances of state-
sponsored religious bigotry dated back forty years or more, while more recent examples in-
volved benignly motivated laws of general applicability that placed only "incidental bur-
dens" on religion and reflected neither "animus [n]or hostility to burdened religious prac-
tices").
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Congress had not compiled findings of unconstitutional conduct in
every State.33 Garrett subsequently- cited neither a state-by-state
requirement nor Morrison at all, but likewise dismissed a lengthy rec-
ord of legislative findings for failure to identify unconstitutional con-
duct expressly by States.' And while Hibbs again seems to depart
from this trend by deeming the congressional record underlying the
FMLA adequate, the decision is careful to emphasize "the extent and
specificity" of unconstitutional state conduct found in that record and
to affirm the continuing validity of Boerne's demanding "means-ends"
approach. 35
This rigorous approach contrasts significantly with that taken by
the Court in a quartet.36 of earlier decisions upholding provisions of
the VRA challenged as enactments exceeding Congress's enforcement
power. South Carolina v. Katzenbach37 upholds congressional power to
suspend literacy tests and other voting qualifications in jurisdictions that
historically engaged in voting discrimination. It also affirms Congress's
power to block such jurisdictions from changing their electoral practices
133. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (stating "that the problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even most States"); Post &
Siegel, supra note 5, at 478.
134. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-69; see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90 (finding that even if a
state report established unconstitutional age discrimination by that State, it was not suffi-
cient to establish that unconstitutional age discrimination " 'had become a problem of na-
tional import.' " (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641)).
Garrett moreover suggests that supportive evidence found in documents outside the
formal legislative record should be disregarded. The opinion disregards "a host of incidents"
that purported to represent unconstitutional state discrimination in employment based on
disability because those incidents consisted "not of legislative findings, but of unexamined,
anecdotal accounts" that did not necessarily rise to constitutional dimension and that were
submitted "not directly" to Congress but instead to a task force that did not specifically ad-
dress state discrimination in employment. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-71.
135. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981-82 & n.ll. To be sure, Hibbs acknowledges that the rec-
ord underlying the FMLA was not markedly more comprehensive than the records Garrett
and Kimel deemed inadequate. Id. at 1981. Hibbs nevertheless insists that Congress may
more easily demonstrate a pattern of state constitutional violations when it targets gender-
based distinctions than when it addresses nonsuspect classifications. The reason, Hibbs
states, is that the heightened judicial scrutiny triggered by gender discrimination makes de-
fending gender-based distinctions more difficult. Id. at 1982; supra note 12. Hibbs leaves un-
answered, however, why this heightened scrutiny did not establish the sufficiency of the far-
more-extensive record underlying VAWA in United States v. Morrison. See 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (rejecting congressional power to subject private parties to liability under VAWA);
see also Coyle, supra note 12 (noting tensions between Hibbs and Morrison). And to the ex-
tent that the Court does accord Congress greater deference in the realm of gender discrimi-
nation, Hibbs makes clear that it will continue to require specific and extensive supporting
congressional findings. Thus while Hibbs is certainly more deferential to legislative judg-
ments than was Kimel or Garrett, the decision hardly accords Congress the tremendous lee-
way displayed in the earlier VRA cases. See infra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
136. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 727 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two
Section Twos and Two Section Fives] (describing voting-rights precedent cited in Boerne as
the "Voting Rights quartet").
137. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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absent prior federal preclearance certifying that the proposed changes
were discriminatory neither in purpose nor in effect.13 Katzenbach v.
Morgan affirms Congress's authority to bar English literacy as a prereq-
uisite to voting for graduates of designated non-English-language
schools. 39 Oregon v. Mitchell4° upholds congressional power to suspend
the use of the literacy tests nationwide for a five-year period. City of
Rome v. United States141 affirms the constitutionality of the VRA's
preclearance process, as extended in 1975, and expressly approves
congressional power to ban within that process practices that are
discriminatory in effect, even if evidence of underlying discriminatory
intent is absent. 142 Read together, these decisions embrace expansive
federal authority to intrude deeply into state sovereign processes, to
prohibit conduct the Constitution permits,1 43 and to promote the race-
conscious policies that inhere in the VRA.'" They support the creation
and maintenance of the large federal bureaucracy needed to implement
the VRA's provisions.
1 45
138. For a description of the preclearance process under § 5 of the VRA, see infra notes
169-171 and accompanying text.
139. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); infra notes 147-153 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan). Congress intended for the provision to over-
ride New York's English literacy requirements, which functioned to disenfranchise thou-
sands of the State's Puerto Rican residents. See STONE ET AL., supra note 63, at 222.
140. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
141. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
142. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173.
143. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1991) (noting that the VRA "demands the intimate
involvement of the courts in state and local electoral systems, even to the extent of setting
aside longstanding political arrangements").
144. See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1179, 1205 (2001) [hereinafter Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist
Court] (noting that compliance with a ban on racially discriminatory effects require those
governed by it to consider race expressly or risk violating the proscription); Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, You Don't Have to be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50
STAN. L. REV. 779, 825 (1998) (noting that under both § 2 and § 5 of the VRA "race is a
privileged criterion" and that "[tihe legislature and everyone who participates in the process
must begin with race"); Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehen-
sive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 107 (2000)
(describing the Court's "implicit recognition that race-based districting to avoid retrogres-
sion may well be required to satisfy the effect prong of section 5 preclearance scrutiny");
Lisa Erickson, Comment, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Criticism of the Justice De-
partment in Miller v. Johnson, 65 Miss. L.J. 409, 421 (1995) (noting that § 5
requires covered jurisdictions to "consider race in implementing new voting practices in
order to achieve equal opportunity in voting rights").
145. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52,53 n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson
eds., 1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61
N.C. L. REV. 189,191 (1983).
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Most notably, they accord considerable deference to congressional
judgments regarding the necessity of the measures.46 Katzenbach v.
Morgan,'47 for example, upheld as appropriate enforcement legislation
section 4(e) of the VRA of 1965. The statute blocked New York from
administering an English literacy requirement that functioned to disen-
franchise large segments of New York City's Puerto Rican community. 148
Morgan states that Congress could have concluded both that New
York's requirement itself constituted "invidious discrimination in estab-
lishing voter qualifications,1' 49 and that it fostered "discrimination in
governmental services." 5 Morgan did not require specific congressional
findings supporting these conclusions, nor did it even mandate that
Congress had in fact reached such conclusions about section 4(e)'s
necessity. Instead, the Court deemed it sufficient that Congress "might
well have questioned" the facially neutral justifications the State
proffered for its law,"' and that the Court could "perceive a basis upon
which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." '152 Morgan states:
"It is not for us to review the congressional resolution" of the factors that
informed that judgment.53
This deference, which several of the opinions in Oregon v. Mitchell
echo,154 and Boerne appears to condone, 55 contrasts noticeably with
146. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 1, at 1110 (noting that these decisions "granted great
deference to Congress in controlling actions of state governments and private persons re-
lated to racial discrimination in voting").
147. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
148. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (2000)).
149. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654.
150. Id. at 653.
151. Id. at 654-55.
152. Id. at 653.
153. Id.
154. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion o fBlack, J.) (stating that Con-
gress "could have found" that literacy tests had racially disparate effects and "could have con-
cluded" that "condition[ing]" the vote on literacy violates the Equal Protection Clause); id at
147 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (stating that Congress "need not make
findings as to the incidence of literacy," and that the legislative history revealed that Congress
was "influenced" by a host of relevant factors); id. at 216 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part, concur-
ring in part) (finding the issue "not free from difficulty," and concluding that "[d]espite lack of
evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or effect, Congress could have de-
termined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly
lend themselves to discriminatory application"); id. at 216 n.94 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part) (stating that legislative history from the 1965 Act sufficed to justify the 1970
ban on literacy tests and noting that "[w]hether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into
the extent and effects of discrimination, either as a condition precedent or as a condition subse-
quent to suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make"); id. (Harlan, J., dis-
senting in part, concurring in part) (noting that "[w]hile a less sweeping approach in this delicate
area might well have been appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of
reasonable."); id. at 233 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (stating that
"[clongressional power to remedy the evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination
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the increasingly rigorous review employed in the Boerne cases.'56 And
yet, the Boerne cases do not purport to overrule the VRA precedent.
Indeed, they self-consciously leave this precedent largely intact.'57
Boerne cites each of the provisions upheld in the VRA quartet from
South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome as permissible
enforcement legislation, despite both "the burden those measures placed
on the States" and their proscription of constitutional conduct.'58
Boerne's progeny, with perhaps somewhat less vigor, likewise invoke the
earlier VRA provisions as examples of permissible congressional action,
and cite the decisions upholding them as so establishing.'59
does not end when the subject of that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in
which the injury occurred").
155. City of Boerne v. Flores, 52t U.S. 507, 528 (1997) (stating that "[b]oth rationales for
upholding § 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York and Congress' reason-
able attempt to combat it"); see also infra Part Il1.
156. See, e.g., William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the,
Demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 83 IOWA L. REV. 391, 417 (1998) (stating
that Boerne "ignores the Morgan limitation that the Court 'be able to perceive' a basis for
Congress's judgment"); Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, supra note 20, at 1143 (arguing that Boerne "departed sharply from the longstanding
tradition of deferential means-ends scrutiny"); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126
(contrasting approach of Court in Boerne with its approach in City of Rome); Karlan, Two
Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 726 (discussing implications of
Boerne for §§ 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 478-79
(noting tension between United States v. Morrison and Oregon v. Mitchell); Bernard
Schwartz, A Presidential Strikeout, Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and Stealth Court, 33
TULSA L.J. 77, 84 (1997) (arguing that the Boerne rationale "is essentially inconsistent with
that of Morgan ... and "without acknowledging it, Boerne adopts the approach urged by
Justice Harlan in his Morgan dissent"); John Matthew Guard, Comment, "Impotent Figure-
heads"? State Sovereignty, Federalism, and the Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights After Lopez v. Monterey County and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329
(1999) [hereinafter Guard, Impotent Figureheads]; see also Eisgruber & Sager, supra note
118, at 95-96 (arguing that Boerne's distinction between remedial- and rights-defining en-
actments by Congress was a self-conscious echo of Harlan's dissenting views in Morgan and
Mitchell). But cf John Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets
Among the Rubble, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 348 (1998/99) (stating that Boerne's preser-
vation of the earlier VRA cases "allow[s] Congress to strike preemptively against proven
forms of discrimination").
157. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 (2001) (contrasting
abrogation of immunity in ADA with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (contrasting VAWA
with statutory provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach v.
Morgan); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88-89 (2000) (discussing South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 639 & n.5 (1999) (citing, as a point of contrast, the VRA quartet); Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 518 (citing VRA quartet as examples of permissible enforcement legislation). The notable
exception is Boerne's rejection of Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion that Congress may ex-
pand the rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 527-28 (1997).
158. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 521 U.S. at 518.
159. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1982 (citing the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach as examples of permissible congressional measures to address a serious prob-
lem); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 (stating that the ADA's "constitutional shortcomings are ap-
parent" when compared with the VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach);
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The Court has nevertheless been unable to distinguish convinc-
ingly the statutory regimes the VRA decisions upheld from those
struck down under the Boerne doctrine. Geographic restrictions,1
60
statutorily mandated expiration dates, 16' and documented examples of
flagrant and pervasive underlying unconstitutional conduct 162 distin-
guish some, but not all, of the provisions preserved. And Boerne itself
insists that valid Section 5 legislation does not require "termination
dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates. '1 63 None of
these elements, moreover, explains the markedly different degrees of
deference employed by the Court in the earlier VRA cases, on the one
hand, and the Boerne cases, on the other.'" In short, the Boerne cases
appear to be doctrinally irreconcilable with the earlier VRA precedent
they purport to preserve. 65
To be sure, in Boerne and its progeny, the Court's preservation of
the cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach through City of Rome
may signify nothing more than its unwillingness to overrule these
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626 (describing VAWA as "unlike" the remedies upheld in Katzen-
bach v. Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89 (contrasting con-
gressional record supporting ADEA's abrogation of state immunity with that underlying the
VRA provisions upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach); Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 639
n.5 (invoking Boerne's discussion of the VRA quartet to distinguish the statutory provision
in dispute).
160. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding § 5 of the
VRA, as extended in 1975).
161. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-81 (upholding extension of § 5, as extended for
seven years); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (upholding
nationwide five-year suspension of literacy tests); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
337 (upholding § 4(a) of the VRA, imposing a five-year ban on literacy tests in covered ju-
risdictions, and the § 5 preclearance process, as limited by the five-year ban). Congress sub-
sequently made the nationwide ban on literacy tests permanent. See Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 201, 89 Stat. 400, 400 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973aa (2000)).
162. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 132 (opinion of Black, J.) (noting that "[i]n enacting the liter-
acy test ban ... Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy
tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 308-29 (noting extensive congressional findings of discriminatory conduct supporting
imposition of preclearance requirement on covered jurisdictions). But compare Morrison,
529 U.S. at 626 (rejecting as inadequate extensive congressional findings of state misconduct
in criminal justice administration where findings did not document misconduct in every
State), with Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 284 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(upholding nationwide ban on literacy tests despite absence of state-by-state findings), and
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646-47 (upholding nationwide prohibition on English lit-
eracy tests despite absence of specific findings supporting unconstitutional use of such tests).
See generally Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison,
and the Future of Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 156 (noting tension be-
tween Morrison and Mitchell); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 478-79 (same).
163. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997).
164. See sources cited supra notes 146 and 156 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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older, historically resonant decisions. 166 And yet, the Court's nearly
unanimous post-Boerne affirmation of the constitutionality of a broad
construction of section 5 of the VRA compels a more broad under-
standing of the Court's preservation of these prior decisions. At issue
in Lopez v. Monterey County167 was whether a jurisdiction subject to
section 5 of the VRA must seek and obtain preclearance prior to
implementing nondiscretionary electoral changes. 61 Monterey County
is a covered jurisdiction under the VRA, 169 meaning that it may not
enact or seek to administer electoral rules unless it receives federal
judicial or administrative preclearance. 70 It must demonstrate, either
to the Attorney General or to the federal district court in Washington,
D.C., that a proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color" or membership in a language-minority group. 7 ' The
dispute in Lopez arose because Monterey County had not obtained
preclearance prior to implementing changes to its system for electing
judges.
Lopez holds that section 5 of the VRA requires preclearance of
the changes, even if state law mandated them and the County exer-
cised no discretion in implementing them. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion holds that nondiscretionary conduct by a covered jurisdiction
must be precleared because it may produce a racially discriminatory
effect.'72 Nondiscretionary conduct, however, necessarily lacks the
discriminatory motivation needed to violate the Constitution. 73 Thus a
166. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1594 (2002) [hereinafter Karlan,
Easing the Spring] (describing the VRA as the "crown jewel of the Second Reconstruction"
and suggesting that the Court "has been unwilling to use strict scrutiny to dismantle [it]").
167. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
168. See generally Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note
144, at 1202-03 (discussing relationship of Boerne and Lopez).
169. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 271 (1999) (interpreting the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437, 438-39 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), (c), 1973c (2000)). A jurisdiction was "covered" if, on the date the
VRA became effective, it employed as a prerequisite to voting devices such as a literacy,
understanding, subject-matter, or moral-character test, and less than fifty percent of the
voting-age population was registered or actually voted in the presidential election of 1964.
See § 4(b), (c), 79 Stat. at 438-39 (defining which jurisdictions were covered). As Congress
extended § 5 in 1970, 1975, and 1982, dates subsequent to 1964 were selected for compara-
tive measurements.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
171. Voting Rights Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 402
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973d, 1973k (2000)). Covered jurisdictions may
seek preclearance either from the Attorney General or from the district court in D.C. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (2000).
172. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283.
173. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.)
(holding that "action by a State that is racially neutral on its face violates the Fifteenth
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proscription against such conduct, even where discriminatory in effect,
seemingly lacks any linkage to unconstitutional action. Under Boerne
and its progeny, such a proscription would appear to be beyond
Congress's enforcement powers.174 To be sure, the prior bad acts that
trigger the coverage designation under section 5 suggest a linkage
between discriminatory effects and invidious intent.1 75 Section 5 elimi-
nates the presumption of validity that typically attaches to govern
mental decisionmaking and shifts "the burden of inertia" to covered
jurisdictions to justify the legality of their conduct. 76 Within this
framework, invidious intent may be assumed to underlie discretionary
conduct that produces a racially discriminatory effect. And yet, that
assumption is not plausible where the conduct in question is nondis-
cretionary.
The Court in Lopez dismisses this concern. Justice O'Connor
states simply "that Congress has the constitutional authority to desig-
nate covered jurisdictions and to guard against changes that give rise
to a discriminatory effect in those jurisdictions.""17 Nondiscretionary
changes can have such an effect, and thus Congress may require cov-
ered jurisdictions to obtain preclearance of them. "[T]he Voting
Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty," she
concludes. "The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intrusion.., and
our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to the
burdens that the Act imposes. 1 78 In other words, this process may be
intrusive,' 79 but it falls well within Congress's enforcement powers to
mandate. The section 5 preclearance process infringes on state sover-
eignty and Lopez affirms that this infringement is constitutionally
permissible. 80
Amendment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239-41 (1976) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment's intentionality requirement).
174. See supra text accompanying note 128.
175. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 294-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing this justification
for § 5 of the VRA).
176. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (noting that Congress passed § 5
in response to the practice of some jurisdictions of passing new discriminatory voting laws as
soon as the old ones had been struck down, and accordingly "to shift the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim" by "freezing election procedures in
the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory").
177. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 283.
178. Id. at 284-85.
179. See also Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 790 (describing preclearance process as "an
unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the states.").
180. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284. Lopez, in fact, references not just § 5 but the Voting Rights
Act in its entirety. Id.
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The Court had previously upheld congressional authority to enact
section 5.181 It had not addressed, however, the constitutionality of the
statute as extended in 1982 or its validity under the Boerne frame-
work. 82 These latter developments had significantly called into ques-
tion the validity of section 5's application to nondiscretionary conduct,
and, more broadly, the validity of the preclearance process itself. And
yet, Lopez blithely dispenses with them. Justice O'Connor cites
Boerne but once, and then for the proposition that Congress's
enforcement power includes the power to prohibit constitutional
conduct and intrude deeply into state sovereign process.8 3 Lopez
ignores the factors that have emerged as central to Boerne's congru-
ence-and-proportionality inquiry, making no mention, for example, of
the congressional findings underlying the 1982 extension of section 5."
Instead, Justice O'Connor affirms the validity of section 5 based on
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome, both of which upheld
earlier versions of section 5 based on distinct legislative findings and
historical circumstances.85
Remarkably, Justice O'Connor's opinion is joined not only by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom dissented in
181. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); see also Guard, Impotent Figureheads, supra note 156,
at 357 (arguing that principles of stare decisis support the Court's holding in Lopez).
182. Lopez was decided the same Term as the Florida Prepaid and College Savings
Bank decisions, both of which developed and extended the Boerne decision. See Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra note 20, at
1147-49 (discussing application of Boerne in the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank
decisions).
183. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-83:
As the Court recently observed with respect to Congress' power to legislate under the Four-
teenth Amendment l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall
within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of autonomy previ-
ously reserved to the States."
Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)) (alteration in original).
184. To be sure, the adequacy of congressional findings has become increasingly central
in the Court's congruence-and-proportionality analysis in decisions post-dating Lopez. See
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-74 (2001); id. at 380-85 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000); see also supra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing treatment of legislative findings in the Boerne decisions). Even so, Boerne addresses
the congressional findings underlying the RFRA in some detail, and months after Lopez,
Florida Prepaid again considered such findings to be of significant import. See Florida Pre-
paid, 527 U.S. at 639; Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997).
185. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-84; see also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 180-82 (discussing
congressional findings supporting the 1975 extension of the Act and agreeing that the need
for the extension was "unsurprising and unassailable" and that it was "plainly a constitu-
tional method of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. at 308-09 (noting extensive congressional findings underlying the 1965 VRA).
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Boerne's progeny,186 but also by Justice Scalia, who voted with the
majority in all of the Boerne decisions.187 So too, the Chief Justice and
Justice Kennedy, who concur in Lopez, and Justice Thomas, who
dissents, express no qualms about the validity of section 5, as amended in
1982.188 The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy disagree with the major-
ity that section 5 of the VRA applies to nondiscretionary electoral
changes. They concur in the judgment because they thought Monterey
had exercised discretionary judgments in the case before the Court.189
Justice Kennedy's opinion identifies no constitutional difficulty with
section 5, so construed. Justice Thomas dissents alone, arguing that the
Court's construction of section 5 contravenes Boerne's congruence-and-
proportionality standard. Requiring preclearance of nondiscretionary
changes, he states, fails to remedy any constitutional wrong. 9' But even
Justice Thomas did not suggest that section 5 itself, as amended in 1982,
is suspect under the Boerne doctrine. Lopez's affirmation of section 5
was not, accordingly, the product of a divided Court.
Of course, this affirmation could be of only limited significance.
Lopez, after all, was primarily a case about a relatively narrow question
of statutory interpretation and did not present a direct challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute. The case was not litigated as a vehicle to
explore the scope of congressional power under the Constitution. 9' At
the time, the Boerne decision was nearly two-years old, and while the
Florida Prepaid cases were pending, the Court might not yet have appre-
ciated the potential breadth of the Boerne doctrine. Justice Thomas
nevertheless alerted the Court that its construction of section 5 of the
VRA implicated serious constitutional questions under Boerne and the
Court responded with sweeping language affirming exceptionally broad
congressional power.
186. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Florida prepaid, 527
U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Justice O'Connor likewise joined the majority in Boerne's progeny, but dissented in
Boerne itself because of her disagreement with the Court's analysis in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Florida
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 289-98
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 288-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
190. See id. at 295-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that nondiscretionary actions
cannot be motivated by unconstitutional conduct, and accordingly that Congress cannot reach
them through enforcement legislation).
191. See, e.g., State Appellee's Brief on the Merits, Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S.
266 (1999) (No. 97-1396); Brief for Appellee Monterey County, Lopez (No. 97-1396); Brief
on the Merits for Appellant, Lopez (No. 97-1396).
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As a result, Lopez magnifies the import of the Court's preservation
of the VRA quartet in the Boerne decisions. 192 Like the VRA decisions
and in contrast to the Boerne cases themselves, Lopez defers to congres-
sional judgments regarding how best to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments.'Y3 It suggests that stare decisis alone does not explain the
Court's insistence that the cases from South Carolina v. Katzenbach to
City of Rome remain good law. Instead, Lopez suggests that the
Rehnquist Court not only accepts the measures upheld in the VRA
quartet but actually prospectively embraces congressional power to
intervene intrusively into state affairs to block racial discrimination in
the political process.
B. Attempting Reconciliation: Voting Rights "Proper" in the
Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court's determined preservation of the VRA
precedent and its broad affirmation of federal power in Lopez appear
even more puzzling given much of the Court's other contemporary
voting-rights jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly, albeit not
exclusively,' read the VRA parsimoniously.'95 These narrow readings
of the VRA contrast with prior precedent' 96 and adopt strained read-
ings of congressional intent.'97 These decisions thus seem to ignore the
deference the Boerne decisions and Lopez suggest Congress enjoys
192. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 129-30 (2003).
193. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. 266 (1999) (adopting a broad construction of § 5 to re-
quire preclearance of nondiscretionary electoral changes implemented by a covered jurisdic-
tion); Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290 (1997) (requiring preclearance of a State's imple-
mentation of separate registration systems for federal and state elections after the National
Voter Registration Act had set parameters for federal elections); Lopez v. Monterey
County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996) (construing broadly § 5 to block elections planned under an un-
precleared statute, even when the result may leave the jurisdiction without an electoral sys-
tem); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991) (adopting broad construction of § 5 to hold
that judicial elections held pursuant to unprecleared statutes should have been enjoined).
195. See, e.g., Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (construing the pur-
pose prong of the VRA's § 5 to proscribe retrogressive intent and not an intent to dilute or
invidious intent more generally); Bossier Parish 1, supra note 30, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) (hold-
ing that § 5 does not block preclearance of voting changes that violate § 2 of the VRA);
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (adopting narrow construction of § 5 that deemed
nonretrogressive a districting plan under which a black-majority district went from repre-
senting one-tenth of the State's delegation to one-eleventh); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994) (holding § 2 of the VRA inapplicable to a challenge to the size of a local governing
structure); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (holding § 5 of the VRA
inapplicable to reallocation of authority among elected officials).
196. See, e.g., Allen v. Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969) (finding that
Congress intended § 5 to have "the broadest possible scope" and to reach "any state enact-
ment which altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way").
197. See infra note 225 and text accompanying note 243.
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when legislating to block racial discrimination in voting.198 Shaw v.
Reno'99 and its progeny,20° moreover, hinder the easy imposition of race-
conscious districting practices that are central to the VRA's plan to
foster political participation by racial minorities. Several scholars have
charged that the Shaw cases manifest hostility to the political gains
made by African Americans and other racial minorities as a conse-
quence of the VRA and the Second Reconstruction more generally. °1
These cases may be understood, however, as expressing a more
particular concern. They manifest the Court's resistance to a particular
type of race-conscious decisionmaking within the political process.
The Court seeks not to mandate colorblindness,22 but instead to
198. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
199. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
200. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 1076 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw
v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
201. See, e.g., KOUSSER, supra note 1; A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A
Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1593, 1603 (1994) (suggesting that Shaw might be the "equivalent for the civil-rights juris-
prudence of our generation to what Plessy v. Ferguson and Dred Scott v. Sandford were for
prior generations"); Karlan, End of the Second Reconstruction?, supra note 1, at 699 (argu-
ing that Shaw "perversely used the equal protection clause ... to make it harder for blacks
to reap the benefits of reapportionment available to other cohesive groups"); Laughlin
McDonald, The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights, 65 Miss. L.J. 271, 273-74
(1995) (arguing the Court "has launched a counterrevolution which threatens to overthrow
the gains in minority office holding so laboriously accumulated over the past 30 years");
Nowak, supra note 1, at 1113 (arguing that the Shaw decisions "made it impossible for the
Attorney General to order or even encourage a state or local legislature to create legislative
district lines in a way that would strengthen minority race voting power"); Jamie B. Raskin,
Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 526-28 (1995) (describing Shaw's
"naked and unprincipled pursuit of inequality" and arguing that "[u]nless it is assumed that
whites have a presumptive constitutional right to be in a political majority, Shaw makes no
sense").
202. The Rehnquist Court periodically celebrates colorblind decisionmaking, and some
Justices laud it as a virtue and a constitutional mandate. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S.
495, 512 (2000) (discussing the Fifteenth Amendment's "mandate of neutrality"); Vera, 517
U.S. at 999 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing "that strict scrutiny is not in-
voked by the intentional creation of majority-minority districts"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 904
(noting that the "central mandate" of the Equal Protection Clause "is racial neutrality in
governmental decisionmaking"); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that "govern-
ment can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to
'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"); Metro Broad., Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing "the cardinal rule that
our Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group"); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(same); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that
"[tihe moral imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause").
Shaw and its progeny do not, however, require race-neutral districting. Racially pre-
dominant districting is subject to strict scrutiny, while racially informed districting practices
do not even trigger heightened review. See Easley, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (finding that race was
considered in the redistricting process, but that it was not the predominant factor and thus
that strict scrutiny was not required); see also Karlan, Easing the Spring, supra note 166, at
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restrict what it sees as excessive reliance on racial factors. To date, it
has deemed such reliance excessive when it has found that race had
been used mechanically, visibly, and decisively in the absence of
congressional authorization.
Shaw and its progeny identify an "analytically distinct" cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause that calls for the application
of strict scrutiny when legislatures subordinate traditional districting
factors to racial considerations, that is, when race is the predominant
factor motivating the districting decision.2 4 Shaw itself focused on the
unusual or "bizarre" shape of the challenged district, emphasizing that
"reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. '205
Subsequent decisions hold that the inquiry focuses on whether race-,
based intent trumps other districting concerns, with district shape
offering probative (but not necessary) evidence of such intent.2 6
The Court has never, however, struck down a districting plan
under Shaw that it thought Congress meant to require. The state
defendants in each of the Shaw cases claimed that the dictates of the
VRA mandated and thus justified the districting plans under chal-
lenge.207 In response, Shaw's progeny are careful to hold that the
VRA, as enacted, amended, and subsequently interpreted by the
Court,2 8 did not require the districting choice disputed in each case.209
1573 (noting that "under the predominant purpose standard, not every use of race renders a
plan constitutionally suspect").
203. The Court's recent decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003), supports
this view. See infra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
204. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
205. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G.
Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993) (describing the analytical
structure of the Shaw injury).
206. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (discussing plaintiff's burden); see also Richard H.
Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the
2000's, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517 (2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Now at War with
Itself?]; Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505, 2539-40, 2548-50 (1997) (discussing importance of district shape under Shaw
and its progeny).
207. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977-83; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 911 (1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at
925-28; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 653-58.
208. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1986) (construing the 1982 Amend-
ments to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act as authorizing a three-part test for vote dilution); see
also William N. Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil
Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 652 n.224 (1991) (describing the Gingles Court as "very
liberally" applying the 1982 VRA Amendments).
209. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 976-79; Hunt, 517 U.S. at 911-16; Miller, 515 U.S. at 923-27.
Admittedly narrow readings of the statute enabled the Court to so hold. See, e.g., Rubin,
supra note 144, at 106; cf. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1465-
66 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (rejecting, prior to Shaw, the notion that "a proposed district must
meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as symmetry or attractiveness"
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Indeed, five Justices expressly held, and the remaining four assumed,
that compliance with the VRA constitutes an interest sufficiently
compelling to justify the predominately racial-districting practices that
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.21°
Absent this assumption, the Shaw cases would significantly narrow
the realm in which congressional action is permissible. Recognition of
a new claim under the Equal Protection Clause might seemingly be
thought to enlarge the realm in which Congress may act by giving it an
additional right to enforce. But absent power to define compelling
interests within the Shaw framework, any additional authority derived
from the Shaw decisions would necessarily encroach upon Congress's
existing Section 5 power to combat racial vote dilution and other
defects in the political process. The result would be not simply a
reallocation of congressional power under Section 5, but a significant
curtailment of it, much in the same way that the obligation to comply
with both the Shaw decisions and the VRA circumscribes the range of
districting options available to state districting authorities.21
The assumption that compliance with the VRA constitutes a com-
pelling interest under Shaw suggests that race may predominate in
districting decisions when Congress mandates it.212 Put differently, the
Shaw decisions suggest that what otherwise might be deemed uncon-
stitutional conduct becomes lawful when authorized by Congress to
block racial discrimination in voting. To be sure, the Shaw decisions
and that "compactness" within the meaning of Gingles, and § 2 of the VRA is a "functional
concept" that is met when "effective[] represent[ation]" is possible).
210. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 977 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e assume without deciding that
compliance with the [§ 2] results test ... can be a compelling state interest); id. at 990, 990-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "compliance with the results test of VRA § 2(b) is a
compelling state interest"); id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ven if strict
scrutiny applies, I would find these districts constitutional, for each considers race only to the
extent necessary to comply with the State's responsibilities under the Voting Rights Act
while achieving other race-neutral political and geographical requirements"); id. at 1046
(Souter, J., dissenting) (describing as significant Justice O'Connor's concurring position
"that compliance with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling state interest"); Hunt, 517
U.S. at 915 ("We assume, arguendo, for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance
with § 2 could be a compelling interest ... ").
211. See, e.g., Stevens's dissent in Vera:
Given the difficulty of reconciling these competing legal responsibilities, the political
realities of redistricting, and the cost of ongoing litigation, some States may simply step
out of the redistricting business altogether, citing either frustration or hopes of getting
a federal court to resolve the issues definitively in a single proceeding.
Vera, 517 U.S. at 1036-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 1045-46
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("The price of Shaw I, indeed, may turn out to be the practical elimi-
nation of a State's discretion to apply traditional districting principles, widely accepted in
States without racial districting issues as well as in States confronting them.").
212. See Karlan, Easing the Spring, supra note 166, at 1586-87 (stating that the assump-
tion that compliance with the VRA can constitute a compelling interest "raise[s] the possi-
bility that congressional or executive understandings of equality that go beyond what the
Constitution itself requires can provide a justification for race-conscious state action").
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hardly accord Congress unlimited discretion in this realm. They
strongly imply, for example, that the mandates of the Equal Protection
Clause preclude Congress from requiring purely race-based district-
ing.213 The Shaw decisions nevertheless imply that the Court thinks
special solicitude is appropriate when Congress frames measures to
block racial discrimination in voting.
This solicitude is absent, however, when decisionmakers act in the
absence of congressional authorization. In the Shaw cases, the Court
found that the state defendants permitted race to predominate in the
absence of congressional authorization. Instead, the Court concluded
that each districting plan had been shaped by the actual or anticipated
demands of the Department of Justice within the preclearance
process. As noted earlier,1 4 under section 5 of the VRA, covered
jurisdictions must demonstrate, either to the Attorney General or to
the federal district court in Washington, D.C., that a proposed change
"does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or membership
in a language minority group.115 The effects-based prong of this stan-
dard, in contrast to its prohibition on intentional racial discrimination,
necessarily requires racially informed decisionmaking.216 But while the
Rehnquist Court accepts as permissible race-consciousness of this
sort," 7 it has long thought that the DOJ has relied excessively on race
in exercising its authority within the section 5 preclearance process.2 18
Several decisions charge that the DOJ has impermissibly required
covered jurisdictions to create the maximum number of black-majority
districts possible, regardless of whether such districts captured com-
munities of interest. 29 The Court has held that the DOJ's pursuit of
213. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
214. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
215. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1973b(f)(2) (2000); Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §
201, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (1975). Covered jurisdictions may seek preclearance either from the
Attorney General or from the district court in D.C. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
216. See supra note 144.
217. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1999); supra notes 165-178 and
accompanying text.
218. See Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at
1180-81, 1212-14 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's mistrust of the Department of Justice).
219. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 85-86 (1997) (noting that the Georgia
legislature had "yielded to the Justice Department's threats, [and] it also adopted the Justice
Department's entirely race-focused approach to redistricting - the max-black policy"); id.
at 87 (finding "strong support ... for finding the second majority-black district ... resulted in
substantial part from the Justice Department's policy of creating the maximum number of
majority-black districts"); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (stating that "[it appears
that the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing
the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia"); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 917 (1995) (noting evidence of Georgia's "predominant, overriding desire" to cre-
ate three black-majority districts to satisfy Department of Justice); id. at 924 (noting that
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this "black-max" policy violates the VRA and the Constitution. 20
Concerned that the Department of Justice has relied excessively on
race within the preclearance process, the Court has sought to rein in
its powers. It has construed the VRA narrowly in several recent cases
addressing DOJ's section 5 powers. For example, the Court's two
decisions in the Bossier Parish cases limit the discretionary judgments
available to DOJ when evaluating preclearance submissions. The first
Bossier Parish decision holds that section 5 permits implementation of
electoral changes that violate section 2 of the VRA.221 It thereby
largely removes from the ambit of the section 5 inquiry the multi-
factored queries into the existence of racial vote dilution that occur
under section 2.22 The second Bossier Parish decision holds that sec-
"[i]nstead of grounding its objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would ap-
pear the Government was driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts").
Scholars disagree about whether the Court's perception of the Department of Justice's
conduct is accurate. Compare Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 780, 804-05, 813 (noting that
the Department of Justice "forced" covered jurisdictions to create specific number of ma-
jority-minority districts and withheld preclearance unless they complied), and Timothy G.
O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 750 (1995)
(arguing that "the legal foundation for the Justice Department's demand that North Caro-
lina and Louisiana craft two majority black districts or that Georgia draw three black dis-
tricts is, at best, dubious"), and Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44
EMORY L.J. 911, 930 (1995) (noting concern "over the Justice Department's coercive role in
bending local jurisdiction to its will" and that Voting Rights Section "has long assumed
freewheeling power to object to districting plans that did not seem 'right' - that is, racially
'fair' "), with Rubin, supra note 144, at 105-06 (disputing Court's characterization of the Jus-
tice Department's conduct), and Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and
the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 34 (1998) (suggesting that the Justice
Department's conduct disputed in Abrams v. Johnson was appropriate), and Thalia L.
Downing Carroll, Casenote, One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? Abrams v. Johnson and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917, 944-45 (1998) (same).
220. See, e.g., Shaw, 517 U.S. at 913 (noting that the Court "again reject[s] the Depart-
ment's expansive interpretation of § 5"); Miller, 515 U.S at 921 (noting that "compliance
with federal antidiscrimination law cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged
district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those
laws"); id. at 925 (stating that "[i]n utilizing § 5 to require States to create majority-minority
districts wherever possible, the Department of Justice expanded its authority beyond what
Congress intended and we have upheld"); see also Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the
Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1212-13.
221. Bossier Parish 1, supra note 30, 520 U.S. 471 (1997). Section 2 prohibits any voting
"standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right.., to
vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). A voting practice is dilutive
and violates § 2,
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
the nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
[members of the protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other mem-
bers of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
222. While not unbounded, see S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982) (listing factors
informing totality of circumstances inquiry under § 2); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding
the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671-76 (2001), claims of racial vote
dilution are indisputably complex. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by
'Election' Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1182 (1999) (noting that minority vote dilution
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tion 5 permits implementation of electoral changes implemented with
a discriminatory, albeit nonretrogressive, intent.223 It thus limits review
to the facially straightforward assessment of retrogression, that is,
whether the proposed change worsens the condition of members of a
racial minority.2 4 Both decisions reflect the Court's hope that by
curbing the discretion exercised by DOJ under the statute, it will block
the DOJ from relying too heavily on race and thereby overstepping its
authority in the future.25
cases lead "the courts into complex fields of effective representation, fair distribution of
governmental resources, and finally, equitable allocation of governmental power").
Proof of vote dilution under § 2 requires establishment of the so-called Gingles precon-
ditions. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting forth preconditions that
a racial group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district," that the group is "politically cohesive," and that the majority "votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate").
Section 2 also requires evidence that the totality of circumstances supports the dilutive qual-
ity of the practice. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994).
223. See Bossier Parish 11, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000); see also Katz, Federalism,
Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1186-90 (discussing decision).
224. The Court's past affinity for retrogression may have reflected its view that the
measure is objective, clear, and easy to administer. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983
(1996) (noting that "[n]onretrogression... merely mandates that a minority's opportunity to
elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's ac-
tions"); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994) (noting "there is little difficulty in discerning
the two voting practices to compare to determine whether retrogression would occur"); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993) (stating that "[a] reapportionment plan would not be narrowly
tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably nec-
essary to avoid retrogression"). The standard, however, is more malleable than these decisions
acknowledge. See, e.g., Abrams, 521 U.S. at 97 (holding nonretrogressive plan that reduces black-
majority district from representing one-tenth of the State's congressional delegation to repre-
senting one-eleventh); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000
Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 745-47, 749 (1998) (arguing that plan deemed nonretrogres-
sive in Abrams left State's African-American population "quantitatively worse off" and that
the Court's treatment of retrogression makes no sense). Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498
(2003), the Court's most recent section 5 decision, adopts a far more fluid understanding of
retrogression, but nevertheless one that continues to curtail DOJ authority. See infra notes
226-233 and accompanying text.
225. See Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at
1213-16. Without doubt, these constructions of section 5 accord Congress far less deference
than the Boerne decisions and Lopez suggest Congress should receive in the realm of race
and the vote. See also supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text (discussing deference).
The Court did not simply suspend Chevron deference sub silentio, but also circumscribed
DOJ discretion beyond what Congress intended. See, e.g., Katz, Federalism, Preclearance,
and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1192-1200 (identifying ways in which the statu-
tory constructions adopted in both decisions appear contrary to congressional intent);
Rubin, supra note 144, at 92 (critiquing as "remarkable" and implausible the Court's assess-
ment of congressional intent in the second Bossier Parish decision). It did so, however, not in
resistance to congressional power to block racial discrimination in voting but instead to
block the DOJ from violating the statute. The decisions do not themselves restrict congres-
sional power to mandate the more broad readings of the statute rejected in each case. But
see Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. at 336 (speculating that the rejected construction of § 5 "per-
haps ... rais[es] concerns about § 5's constitutionality" but resting its holding on its finding
that this construction "finds no support in the language of § 5"); cf Nowak, supra note 1, at
1119 n. 114 (arguing that the Court in Bossier Parish II did not rule on the scope of Con-
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The Court's recent decision in Georgia v. Ashcrof12 6 may be simi-
larly understood. At issue in the case was whether Georgia could
permissibly replace some majority-minority districts with so-called
"coalition" and "influence" districts.27 In coalition districts, black
voters need not comprise the majority of a district's population to be
able to elect representatives of choice, while influence districts permit
minority voters to exert some sway in the electoral process, but not
necessarily elect representatives of choice. 22' The Court in Georgia v.
Ashcroft was unanimous in holding that the VRA does not require
that covered jurisdictions like Georgia mechanically retain majority-
minority districts whenever possible within constitutional constraints.
All nine justices agreed that section 5 instead allows use of coalition
districts as an alternative. 29 A majority of the Court, moreover, held
that the VRA permits covered jurisdictions to rely as well on influence
districts to preserve minority voting strength. 3°
Georgia v. Ashcroft holds that covered jurisdictions have the dis-
cretion to select among these districting devices, 23 ' and that a jurisdic-
tion's decision to replace majority-minority districts with a mixture of
influence, coalition, and majority-minority districts need not be retro-
12gressive.2 The Court accordingly relies on a far more malleable
conception of retrogression than it espoused in the Bossier Parish
cases, which deemed the very rigidity of the retrogression to be among
its primary virtues.233 Georgia v. Ashcroft nevertheless follows the
Bossier Parish decisions by continuing to circumscribe the discretion
of the Justice Department within the preclearance process. Georgia v.
Ashcroft cedes to covered jurisdictions discretion unprecedented
within the preclearance process to shape their electoral districts, and
thereby restricts the ability of the Justice Department to use the newly
identified fluidity in the retrogression standard to manipulate district-
ing decisions. That retrogression remains a meaningful curb on racial
gress's power to enact legislation under the Fifteenth Amendment). See generally infra Part
I1I.A.
226. 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003).
227. See generally Pildes, Is Voting Rights Law Now at War With Itself?, supra note 206,
at 1522 (defining and discussing coalition districts).
228. Id.
229. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511-12; id. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2512-13.
231. See id. at 2511-13 (noting that, as between majority-minority and coalition districts,
"[sjection 5 does not dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting over
another."); id. at 2513 ("Section 5 leaves room for States to use these types of influence and
coalitional districts .... [T]he State's choice ultimately may rest on a political choice of
whether substantive or descriptive representation is preferable.").
232. Id. at 2515 (suggesting that Georgia "likely met its burden of showing nonretro-
gression").
233. See supra notes 221-225 and accompanying text.
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discrimination remains to be seen. What is clear is that the ability of
the DOJ to demand fixed numbers of majority-minority districts is
greatly diminished.
Finally, Holder v. Hall234 and Presley v. Etowah County Commis-
sion,235 appear to evince hostility to the VRA, but in fact rest on
constructions of congressional intent that leave room for statutory
amendments authorizing the proscriptions rejected in each case. At
issue in Holder was the allegation that county governance by a single
commissioner instead of by multiple commissioners elected from
districts diluted the vote of the County's African-American commu-
nity, and thereby had a racially discriminatory result within the
meaning of section 2 of the VRA.236 Holder holds section 2 inapplica-
ble to the challenge, finding that "[t]here is no principled reason why
one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for compari-
son."237 Presley holds that laws altering the powers exercised by elected
county commissioners are not changes "with respect to voting" within
the meaning of section 5 of the VRA, and hence not changes for which
preclearance is required.238 Presley states that subjecting such changes to
preclearance "would work an unconstrained expansion of [section 5's]
coverage," and noted "appellants fail to give any workable standard to
determine when preclearance is required." 239
The Court could have held otherwise in both cases, at least on the
facts presented. The law altering the commissioners' powers in Presley
had been adopted following a voting-rights lawsuit that altered the struc-
ture of the commission and resulted in the election of an African-
American commissioner.24" The contested law, accordingly, appeared to
resemble the type of law section 5 was meant to address. 24' In Holder, the
234. 512 U.S. 874 (1994).
235. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
236. Holder, 512 U.S. at 876-79 (noting African Americans constituted twenty percent
of the county's population and that this community was sufficiently concentrated and cohe-
sive to elect one representative to a five-person commission, if districts were drawn to allow
black voters to do so).
237. See id. at 881 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.).
238. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 503-08 (construing VRA § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (requiring
preclearance if a covered jurisdiction "shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualifica-
tion or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting dif-
ferent from that in force or effect" on designated dates)).
239. Id. at 504-05.
240. Id. at 522 n.23 and accompanying text; see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY 179-80 (1994); Rubin, supra note 144, at 64 n.181; Robert Bryson Carter,
Note, Mere Voting: Presley v. Etowah County Commission and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 71 N.C. L. REV. 569, 593 (1993) (arguing that Presley engages in "hamstringing" that
"frustrates the Act's congressional intent").
241. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1996) (stating that "Section 5 was a
response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal
courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck
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predominant statewide practice of county governance by five-member
commissions offered a potential benchmark against which to evaluate
the County's reliance on a single commissioner to govern.242 Instead, the
Court adopted narrow readings of the VRA in each case and thereby
departed from prior decisions expressing the Court's view that Congress
intended for the VRA to be given "the broadest possible scope. '24 3 And
yet, Holder's concern about the absence of a meaningful benchmark and
Presley's wariness of the slippery slope reflect the Court's conviction
that Congress had not intended the broad statutory construction prof-
fered in each case. Both decisions hold only that Congress did not
authorize the restructuring of local governance plaintiffs sought in
each case; they do not hold that Congress could not require such
restructuring.244
III. BREACHING STATE AUTONOMY TO ASSURE STATE PRIMACY
The Rehnquist Court, like the Waite Court before it, appears to
recognize distinct congressional power to address racial discrimination
in the political process. It painstakingly preserved the VRA precedent
in the Boerne cases 45 and affirmatively embraced sweeping congres-
sional power in Lopez.246 In developing the Shaw doctrine, it suggested
that Congress possesses unique authority to require race-based deci-
sionmaking,2 47 and, even when it read the VRA narrowly, it preserved
the possibility for the broad exercise of congressional power.248 The
down"); see also Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320, 366 (2000) (Souter, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the "statute contains no reservation in
favor of customary abridgment grown familiar after years of relentless discrimination, and
the preclearance requirement was not enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old
poison into new bottles").
242. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 955 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that five-
person commission used widely throughout the State offered an appropriate benchmark); see
also Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: [E]racing Democracy: The
Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 109, 114 (1994) (arguing that Holder "undermines
Congress's decision to override local majorities whose election structures result in minority
group exclusion"); Tucker, supra note 1, at 574 (arguing that Holder "substantially cut back
on the 'broad construction' of the Voting Rights Act given by the Court in cases such as
Allen and endorsed by Congress").
243. See, e.g., Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978); Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1969).
244. Congress has previously enacted more expansive statutes in response to narrow
judicial constructions of them. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff
Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1991). That it will do so in
connection with the VRA and specifically with section 5 when it expires in 2007 remains to
be seen.
245. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 210-213 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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Court has not, however, expressly explained why it seems to think that
Congress enjoys special power to block racial discrimination in state
political processes.
While several rationales may explain the Court's approach, this
Part argues that it is best understood in functional terms. Like the
Waite Court, the Rehnquist Court accepts the deep intrusion into
state sovereignty that results from the exercise of congressional inter-
vention to address racial discrimination in voting. It views such power
as necessary to ensure state primacy over the protection of individual
rights more generally.
A. Reasons for Deference: Text, History, and the Functional View
The Fifteenth Amendment expressly addresses racial discrimina-
tion in voting. It provides that a citizen's right to vote "shall not be
denied or abridged" based on race, and, in Section 2, cedes to
Congress "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 249
It thus ostensibly offers a textual basis to explain judicial deference to
congressional power in this realm. Reese and Cruikshank suggest that
Congress has more power to address private conduct under the
Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth and thereby appear
to distinguish congressional powers under the two Amendments. 2 0
Lopez v. Monterey County arguably suggests a similar distinction by
invoking the Fifteenth Amendment alone as providing constitutional
authority for the enactment of section 5 of the VRA.251
The language of Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, however,
parallels that of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,25 2 and the
modern Court has repeatedly insisted that congressional power under
both sections is "coextensive. ' 253 Accordingly, whether deferential or
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
250. See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
251. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999).
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall hav.e power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 2 ("The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.").
253. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001)
(noting that the two enforcement clauses are "virtually identical"); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (citing precedent addressing Congress's enforcement powers under
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Eighteenth Amendments without distinguishing among these
grants of authority); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (noting similarity be-
tween Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments enforcement powers); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) ("The basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Con-
gress with relation to the reserved powers of the States."); see also Lopez, 525 U.S. at 294 n.6
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Although Boerne involved the Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment power, we have always treated the nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as coextensive."); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 208 n.] (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he nature of the enforcement
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rigorous, review of legislation enacted pursuant to either section
should be based on the same standard. The Court, moreover, has
expressly held that both Amendments protect voting rights,254 and has
deferred to congressional efforts to address racial discrimination in
voting, regardless of the Amendment under which the Court under-
stood Congress to have acted.255 Constitutional text, standing alone,
thus does not explain judicial deference to Congress in this realm.
The long history of racial discrimination in voting in the United
States certainly informs the Court's deferential stance. Professors Dorf
and Friedman point out that when Congress enacted the VRA in 1965,
"it was entirely plausible" for the legislature to conclude that racial
animus motivated voting rules having a disparate racial impact, even
where specific proof of invidious intent was unavailable.256 This plausi-
ble conclusion, in turn, permits judicial deference to federal legislation
proscribing racially discriminatory effects in the voting realm, even
absent detailed legislative findings linking intent and effect . 7 The
Boerne decisions permit Congress to assume this linkage for voting-
rights legislation enacted not just in 1965, but also in 1970 and 1975,258
while Lopez v. Monterey County assumes the linkage for the 1982
Amendments to section 5, as applied in the 1990s.
2 19
Still, history alone does not explain the Court's deferential
approach. Racial discrimination in voting is not limited to the distant
powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as
coextensive."); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 783-84 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting that the language of both Amendments is virtually the same and that the courts
should use the same standard to gauge the scope of congressional authority for both).
254. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding the right to
vote to be a fundamental right protected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Rey-
nolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (locating within the Equal Protection Clause authority for
the principle of one person, one vote in apportionment).
255. See, e.g., Lopez, 525 U.S. at 284-85 (upholding the constitutionality of § 5 of the
VRA under the Fifteenth Amendment); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (affirming validity of § 4(e)
of the VRA as valid legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. at 658 (upholding § 4(e) of the VRA (exclusively) under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
256. Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126.
257. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 305-09 (noting the extensive
findings supporting the VRA), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 658 (upholding § 4(e)
of the VRA, adopted by floor Amendment with no accompanying legislative findings); see
also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 284 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) ("In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader
brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding indi-
vidual cases and controversies upon individual records.").
258. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (preserving VRA quartet); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at
159 (addressing the 1975 extension of § 5 of the VRA); Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(addressing the 1970 Amendments to the VRA).
259. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282-83 (upholding broad reading of § 5 of the VRA as ex-
tended in 1982); see also supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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past,2 6' but neither are other types of longstanding unconstitutional
discrimination such as gender discrimination. The Court, however,
routinely defers to congressional efforts to address racial discrimina-
tion in voting, but its treatment of congressional attempts to address
gender discrimination is decidedly mixed. Whereas the Court in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs upheld the FMLA
as an effort to protect against unconstitutional gender discrimination,
the Court in United States v. Morrison did not find the long and con-
tinuing history of gender discrimination in state criminal-justice
systems sufficient to defer to Congress's assessment of the magnitude
of the constitutional injury or to its selection of the appropriate
remedy.261' Historical and persistent discrimination is accordingly not
sufficient to trigger the Court's deference.
Congressional efforts to address racial discrimination outside the
voting context likewise consistently fail to elicit judicial deference. To
be sure, blocking discrimination based on race is at the core of the
Reconstruction-era Amendments. Described by the Slaughter-House
Cases as their "one pervading purpose, '26 2 this aim arguably suggests a
two-tiered approach in which Congress enjoys greater power to block
racial discrimination under these Amendments than it does to regulate
other types of conduct. 263 A generation ago, Justice Black espoused
this view, stating that "[w]here Congress attempts to remedy racial
discrimination under its enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced
by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. ''2' The Boerne decisions support this
approach insofar as they invalidate statutes, including some seemingly
traditional civil-rights measures, which did not address racial discrimi-
nation, while preserving the VRA precedent, which did.265 Still,
260. See, e.g., Bossier Parish 11, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320, 347-49 (2000) (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing stipulated facts indicating resistance among
white school-board members to the election of a black school-board member).
261. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615, 625-26 (2000); id. at 630-31 n.7
(Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Gender Bias Task Force reports that Congress considered); id.
at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing congressional reports documenting unconstitutional
gender bias in state-court systems); see also supra notes 121 and 133 and accompanying text.
262. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873) (describing the aim of
the new Amendments to be "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him").
263. STONE ET AL., supra note 63, at 434 (noting that Slaughter-House can be read to
suggest such a two-tiered approach, with the Fourteenth Amendment read expansively to
provide comprehensive federal protection of the newly freed slaves, but otherwise leaving
"state resident's primary recourse for protection of rights [] to his own state government").
264. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.); see also Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 285-
86 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]n end of discrimination against the
Negro was the compelling motive of the Civil War Amendments").
265. See supra Part II.A.
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decisions by both the Rehnquist and Waite Courts refuse to accord
special deference to Congress's efforts to address racial discrimination
not directly implicating the political process. The Civil Rights Cases
strike down Congress's effort to reach private racial discrimination in
public accommodations while United States v. Harris invalidates simi-
lar efforts to block privately orchestrated, racially motivated
assaults.266 So too, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena267 holds that
race-based classifications authorized by Congress are subject to the
same strict scrutiny City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 26s applies to
race-based decisionmaking by state and local actors.269 Congressional
efforts to grapple with racial discrimination do not, alone, trigger judi-
cial deference.
Congressional authority to address racial discrimination in voting
appears relatively circumscribed when compared with its power to
protect a host of property and liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment. While in fact potentially quite broad,27° the power to
address racial discrimination in voting still seems unlikely to devolve
into a plenary power.271 The Court could accordingly view deference
to Congress here as less damaging to federalism values than is defer-
ence to other types of enforcement legislation. 2  To be sure, to the
266. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 12 (1883) (invalidating ban on racial discrimi-
nation in public accommodations found in the Civil Rights Act of 1875); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating a federal antilynching statute meant to address
widespread, unremediated violence against black southerners, applicable regardless of state
dereliction of the guardianship role).
267. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny applicable to a federal statute that pre-
sumed African Americans and other racial minorities to be "disadvantaged" and thus eligi-
ble for federal affirmative-action contracting program).
268. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
269. Adarand potentially leaves room for judicial deference to congressional judgments
regarding the need to rely on race in a decisonmaking process, but the Court has yet to so
hold. See Adarand, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (dismissing case as improvidently granted).
270. See infra notes 369-370 and accompanying text.
271. Cf. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, supra
note 20, at 1190-91 (noting that "[t]he ends authorized by this Section 2 [of the Fifteenth
Amendment] are far more constrained than those authorized by Section 5 ... the latter
touch upon a wide a variety of liberty and property interests in a wide variety of contexts;"
and arguing that deferential review of § 2 legislation would not "functionally award Con-
gress a virtually plenary police power"); Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126
(evaluating whether the "narrower subject matter" of the Fifteenth Amendment means that
the Court can "afford" to accord Congress greater deference).
272. Professors Dorf and Friedman suggest, but ultimately reject, this explanation for
the Court's approach to voting cases. Because Congress's enforcement power under the
Thirteenth Amendment could become plenary, they argue that "the difference in wording
and subject matter among the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments does not
justify the narrower approach that the Court has lately taken toward the Fourteenth." See
Dorf & Friedman, supra note 128, at 91 n.126. This conclusion depends on how the Court
will address congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment in the post-Boerne
world, something it has yet to do. Cf. United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002),
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extent that congressional power here is not -tethered exclusively to the
Fifteenth Amendment,273 it is not necessarily more circumscribed than
Congress's power to remedy age discrimination in state employment
or gender bias in the criminal-justice system, problems over which the
Court has accorded Congress little deference when structuring
enforcement measures. 274
The bounded character of Congress's power to block racial dis-
crimination in voting may nevertheless help explain judicial deference
to congressional efforts to address racial discrimination in voting. The
congressional power may be seen as bounded insofar as its exercise
renders more extensive federal legislation unnecessary. As Professor
Issacharoff explains, "process-based claims can relieve a conservative
judiciary of any obligation to police substantive distributional out-
comes of the policy decisions of elected political bodies.
275
Judicial deference to Congress in this realm reflects the assumption
that individual liberty is best protected at the state and local level,276
but only so long as state and local governments are democratically
accountable.277 The next two Sections attempt to establish that this as-
sumption about state power and democratic representation underlies
decisions by both the Waite and Rehnquist Courts.
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835 (2002) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) under the Thirteenth
Amendment).
273. See supra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.
274. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000),
275. Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1869 (1992); see also Karlan, Easing
the Spring, supra note 166, at 1591:
Regulation of the political process represents a decision to combat the risk of unconstitu-
tional discrimination on the wholesale level, by providing all citizens with an equal opportu-
nity to participate effectively in the political process, rather than leaving all enforcement to
the retail level by enacting laws that impose equal-treatment obligations in indiscrete areas
of state-government activity such as schools, public employment, or housing.
276. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045
(1997); see also David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitution-
alism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 491 (1999) (arguing that local governments "are often
uniquely well positioned to give content to the substantive constitutional principles ... bet-
ter positioned in some instances, that is, than either federal or state institutions"); cf.
BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 59 (noting post-Civil War Republican "hope ... that the south-
ern states would do the job of protecting all their citizens' rights").
277. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) ("The presump-
tion of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational' classifications in other types of en-
actments are based on the assumption that the institutions of state government are struc-
tured so as to represent fairly all the people."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1880)
(describing the right to vote as the "preservative of all rights").
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B. Reinforcing Representation in the Waite Court
Sixty years before Justice Stone's famous footnote four,278 the
Waite Court understood that racial discrimination inhering in the
political process may prevent state governments from adequately pro-
tecting individual rights. Ex parte Yarbrough279 sustains Congress's
power to block privately orchestrated, racially motivated violence
affecting congressional elections. The decision is typically read to
uphold virtually plenary congressional power to regulate federal elec-
tions, but to offer no support for analogous authority over state and
local elections.280
Yarbrough, however, posits a functional understanding of congres-
sional power that suggests Congress also enjoys considerable authority
to protect the integrity of nonfederal elections. Yarbrough assumes
nontextual authority for Congress's power to regulate federal elec-
278. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities").
279. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). Yarbrough sustained convictions obtained based on indict-
ments charging a private conspiracy to "intimidate" a black man, "on account of his race,"
"in the exercise of his right to vote for a member of congress," even though the underlying
statutory provision blocked such intimidation without regard to racial motivation. Id. at 657.
280. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 490 (stating that Yarbrough avoided the state-
action constraints of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "by determining that the
right of a qualified voter to cast his ballot in a federal election was based on Article I, and
the power of Congress to protect it did not depend on the post-Civil War Amendments");
Charles A. Kent, Constitutional Development in the United States, as Influenced by the Deci-
sions of the Supreme Court Since 1865, in CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES
BEFORE THE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 201,
226 (1889) (reading Yarbrough to be exclusively about federal elections); Michael J.
Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 62 n.42 (2001) (citing Yarbrough as precedent
upholding congressional power under Article I, Section 4, to regulate individual action inter-
fering with the right to vote in federal elections);. Lawsky, supra note 96, at 806 n.142
(Yarbrough addresses the right to vote in congressional elections); Nowak, supra note 1, at
1107 & nn.54-55 (same); Michael S. Steinberg, Note, A Critique of the Current Method of
Scheduling Primary Elections and a Discussion of Potential Judicial Challenges, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 462 (2001) (citing Yarbrough as authority for "Congress's unique abil-
ity, indeed responsibility, to regulate the fair conduct of federal elections"); cf CHARLES
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1862-1890, at 308 (1939) (dis-
cussing Yarbrough and stating that based on Article I, Section 4 "and from other provisions,
a power is deduced to insure free and pure elections").
Historians dispute the significance of Yarbrough insofar as the decision is limited to fed-
eral elections. Compare Maltz, supra note 36, at 85 (noting that even if Yarbrough reached
no further than federal elections, it offered Congress "substantial power" to block private
efforts to prevent African Americans from voting; those seeking to interfere with registra-
tion would not distinguish federal from state elections, and many state and federal elections
were held at the same time), with BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 66 & 152 n.42 (reading Yar-
brough as limited to congressional elections, and arguing that congressional power in this
regard was inadequate given that "state and local elections were where the officeholders
most directly affecting people's lives were chosen").
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tions. Article I, Section IV permits Congress to regulate congressional
elections, but says nothing about presidential elections. 28' Yarbrough
nevertheless insists that "[i]t is essential to the successful working of
this government that the great organisms of its executive and legisla-
tive branches should be the free choice of the people. '282 It deems
critical congressional power to ensure that both the federal executive
and legislative branches represent "the free choice of the people," '283
notwithstanding the absence of textual support for this broad power.
When Yarbrough was decided, moreover, the Court's concern for
the representative quality of the federal legislature would have pro-
vided the basis for congressional power to reach state elections. At
that time, state legislatures still selected United States Senators.
Accordingly, the capacity of the U.S. Senate to represent "the free
choice of the people" rested exclusively on the representative quality
of the state legislatures selecting Senators.2" To be effective, congres-
sional power to protect the representative character of the Senate
seemingly needed to encompass regulatory power over state legis-
lative elections as well.285
Most significant, however, is Yarbrough's discussion of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Yarbrough petitioners relied on Fourteenth
Amendment precedent restricting Congress's ability to reach private
281. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.").
282. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666.
283. Id.; see id. at 657 (noting that the government's "executive head and legislative
body" are both elective and speaking of the federal government's "power to protect the elec-
tions on which its existence depends from violence and corruption"); see also Dan T. Coenen
& Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past
and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 887-88 (2002) (arguing that Yar-
brough "planted the seed" for recognizing congressional power to regulate the processes for
the selection of presidential electors); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Con-
stitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 893, 984 (1997) (citing Yarbrough and stating that "the Court held that Congress has
the power to regulate presidential elections because it must - because such a power must
exist in a republic"); Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and Presidential Elec-
tions, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1968) (noting that "[wihile the indictment in [Yarbrough] in-
volved only a congressional election and was based on intimidation of Negro voters - un-
doubtedly a special case under the fifteenth amendment - the reasoning of the Court went
much further"); Steinberg, supra note 280, at 461-62 (arguing that Yarbrough's reasoning
does not distinguish between congressional and presidential elections).
284. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof .. " (amending Art. I, Section
3, which provided that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof')).
285. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658, 666 (noting that Congress "must have the power to
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption" and that
it needs such authority to retain its legitimacy as "the free choice of the people," a condition
that is "essential to the successful working of this government").
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action to support their claim that Congress could not block privately
initiated assaults on black voters.286 This reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment precedent seems misplaced. The assault at issue in Yar-
brough occurred during a congressional election. Article I, Section IV
provides Congress ample authority to regulate such elections, 287 and
thus any strictures on congressional action taken pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment simply did not pertain. The assault, moreover, oc-
curred because the victim had exercised his right to vote. Prior to Yar-
brough, the Fourteenth Amendment was generally not thought to
protect the quintessentially "political" right to vote.2 88 Accordingly,
the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription on state action and any
limitation on congressional action that might follow from it ostensibly
had no bearing on the question of congressional power to bar privately
initiated assaults on voters in congressional elections.289
Justice Miller's opinion for the Court in Yarbrough dismisses the
defendants' reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment precedent. But it
ignores both of these readily available grounds for doing so.
Yarbrough elsewhere recognizes distinct federal power to regulate and
protect federal elections, 290 but makes no mention of this authority as a
reason to reject the defendants' Fourteenth Amendment claims. And
while the "political" nature of the right to vote might similarly have
offered grounds to distinguish Fourteenth Amendment precedent,
286. Id. at 665-66; see also Brief for Petitioners at 11, Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884) (No. 75) (arguing that the Court had never "held that Congress has the power to pre-
scribe penalties, or to interfere with the sovereignty of the States, except to prevent the
States, or their officers and agents, from overriding or disregarding the restrictions imposed
upon the States themselves" by the new Amendments).
287. See supra note 280.
288. On the distinctions among civil, political, and social rights during Reconstruction,
compare AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 216-18 n. * (1998); and HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 36, at 395-97; and EARL MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CONGRESS 1863-1869, at 118-20 (1990); and WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988); and Roderick
M. Hills, Back to the Future? How the Bill of Rights Might Be About Structure After All, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 977, 993-94 & n.60 (1999) (reviewing AMAR, supra); with RICHARD A.
PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 153-76 (1999) (describing the fluidity with
which the terms civil, political, and social rights were used during Reconstruction); and Reva
Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing
State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1997) (noting that "[d]istinctions among civil, po-
litical, and social rights functioned more as a framework for debate than a conceptual
scheme of any legal precision").
289. A century after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
held the protection of voting rights to be within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); see also Hills, supra note 288, at 994-95 (describing these decisions as a "direct
repudiation of the fundamental assumptions underlying the Fourteenth Amendment").
290. See Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 658, 666 (noting that Congress "must have the power to
protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption" and that
it needs such authority to retain its legitimacy as "the free choice of the people," a condition
that is "essential to the successful working of this government").
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Justice Miller's opinion instead suggests that this right is within the
Amendment's ambit. Nearly a century before the Court expressly
recognized the Fourteenth Amendment to protect voting rights,291
Yarbrough states that "while it may be true that acts which are mere
invasions of private rights" are, absent state action, "not within the
scope" of the Fourteenth Amendment, "it is quite a different matter
when Congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise of
rights conferred by the Constitution of the United States essential to
the healthy organization of government itself.
292
According to the Court's opinion in Yarbrough, the defendants'
reliance on Fourteenth Amendment precedent was misplaced because
the types of rights at issue in cases like the Civil Rights Cases and
United States v. Harris are distinct from the one at issue in Yarbrough.
The opinion implicitly categorizes the rights to nondiscriminatory use
of public accommodations and to freedom from racially motivated
assaults as "private rights" over which the states retain the primary
authority and responsibility to protect.293 Precedent addressing such
rights afforded the defendants "no aid in the present case,' 294 because
a black voter's right to participate in the political process free of racial
discrimination is seen to constitute a constitutionally protected right
"essential to the healthy organization of government itself. '295
Yarbrough accordingly posits the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a hierarchy of rights. Regardless of the
constraints that limit congressional power to reach private action in
other realms, "it is quite a different matter" when Congress acts to
protect these essential ones. Yarbrough suggests that Congress may
prohibit private assaults on black voters in federal and state elections
alike,296 because, absent such authority, "the very sources of power
may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage,
without legal restraint. 297
Justice Miller's opinion is not concerned with identifying a textual
source for this congressional power, noting that "it is a waste of time
291. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
292. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666.
293. See Maltz, supra note 36, at 86 (arguing that Yarbrough and Cruikshank "posit a set
of preexisting rights whose protection is remitted to the state governments").
294. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 666.
295. Id.
296. The basis upon which Yarbrough rejected the defendants' reliance on the Four-
teenth Amendment precedent indicates the Court did not think this congressional power
was limited to federal elections.
297. Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 667. Justice Miller's general reference to the "sources of
power," as opposed to a more specific reference to the sources of congressional power or
even federal power, supports reading Yarbrough as recognizing congressional authority to
protect state and federal elections from racial discrimination.
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to seek specific sources of power to pass these laws. '298 The opinion is
more interested in identifying the necessity of this federal power in
functional terms. Whatever the difficulties that may follow from
"invasions of private rights," racial discrimination affecting voting
rights is understood to work a distinct harm and to require a distinct
remedy. According to Yarbrough, such discrimination interferes with
the "healthy organization of government" and thereby renders states
ill-equipped to protect individual rights and govern properly.
Yarbrough does not question Cruikshank's assertion that the "duty
of protecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights
was originally assumed by the states, and it remains there." '299 By 1884,
however, the Court recognized that performance of this state function
depended on the "healthy organization of government." Congress
needed broad power to create the state and federal institutions neces-
sary for healthy representative governance within the federal system.
The hope is that this power to reinforce representation at the local
level will render unnecessary massive federal intervention supplanting
state primacy in the protection of individual liberty.
In this sense, Yarbrough builds on the Waite Court's decision four
years earlier in Strauder v. West Virginia.3" Strauder holds that a state
law blocking blacks from jury service violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Justice Strong's opinion for the Court suggests that the West
Virginia statute might function to deny black defendants impartial
treatment within the criminal-justice system.3"1 So understood, the law
represents a straightforward violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.02 The Court, however, also appears to identify an equal protec-
298. Id. at 666.
299. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); see United States v. Cruikshank,
25 F. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14, 899) (opinion of Bradley, J.) ("The affirmative
enforcement of the rights and privileges themselves, unless something more is expressed,
does not devolve upon [the United States], but belongs to the state government as a part of
its residuary sovereignty."); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 63, at 435 (arguing that the
Court's reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Civil Rights Cases "grew out of the
same view of the states as the primary protector of individual rights that the Court expressed
in Slaughter-House"); BRAEMAN, supra note 57, at 65 (stating that Cruikshank held that the
Fourteenth Amendment had not "taken from the states primary responsibility for the pro-
tection of basic individual rights"); Kennedy, supra note 36, at 102 (noting that "the Waite
Court sought to protect blacks within the framework of constitutional modifications that
preserved a state-centered nationalism").
300. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
301. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309 (noting that "prejudices often exist against particular
classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate
in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which
others enjoy"); see also AMAR, supra note 288, at 272 & n.162; Hills, supra note 288, at 998-
99.
302. See MALTZ, supra note 288, at 103-04 (noting view that the Equal Protection
Clause "requires that the states make available on equal terms the mechanism necessary to
enforce the rights created either by other provisions of the Constitution or by state law");
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tion injury suffered not by Strauder, but by the potential black jurors
the state law excluded from jury service. Justice Strong's opinion
states that West Virginia's express exclusion of blacks from the jury
denied them "the privilege of participating equally.., in the admini-
stration of justice" and "all right to participate in the administration of
the law, as jurors.""3 3 The exclusion operated expressively as "practi-
cally a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority." It worked functionally as "a stimulant to that race preju-
dice which is an impediment to securing individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others."3"
Prior to Strauder, the Fourteenth Amendment was not generally
thought to guarantee black men the right to sit on juries.3 °s Strauder
nevertheless holds that the Amendment provides this guarantee. The
decision recognizes what Professor Hills calls the "tight unity"
between defendant Strauder's right to an impartial trial and the
participatory rights of potential black jurors.3" Justice Strong's opin-
ion, Professor Hills explains, upholds the rights of these excluded
jurors in order to protect Strauder's right to a fair trial. Since review-
ing every jury verdict for impermissible racial discrimination is neither
feasible nor desirable, Strauder seeks "to create the institutions neces-
sary for the vindication of private rights."3 °7
Yarbrough, like Strauder, suggests that racial discrimination
affecting state political institutions precludes States from adequately
protecting individual rights. Institution building at the state level was
essential to vindicate the rights guaranteed by the new Amendments
while still preserving the federal structure. Events at the time demon-
strated that "private rights" would not be protected absent political
institutions dedicated to their defense.3 8 Strauder shows the Waite
Hills, supra note 288, at 997 ("[I]mpartiality in criminal trials is the quintessential civil right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
303. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 369 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting); see also
AMAR, supra note 288, at 273-74; PRIMUS, supra note 288; Vikram David Amar, Jury Service
as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995); Hills, supra note
288; Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947,101.4-23 (1995); Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accomodations and Pri-
vate Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1349-50 (1996); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles
Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIST. 884,886-90 (1987).
306. Hills, supra note 288, at 999; see also AMAR, supra note 288, at 272 (noting that
Strauder "straddled the question of whose rights this scheme violated").
307. Hills, supra note 288, at 997; id. at 1000 ("[Jludicial regulation of the structure of
juries seems like the only way in which a court can vindicate the civil rights that the [Four-
teenth Amendment's] framers unquestionably wished to protect.").
308. Hills, supra note 288, at 980, 1001 (stating that "private rights divorced from gov-
ernmental structures were futile 'parchment barriers.' In order to be effective, rights must be
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Court's willingness to mandate institutional change through direct
constitutional interpretation. Yarbrough agrees that such institutions
needed to be established, but does not itself reform the state institu-
tion. Instead, Yarbrough welcomes congressional participation in the
endeavor.
C. Reinforcing Representation in the Rehnquist Court
City of Boerne v. Flores rejects Katzenbach v. Morgan's suggestion
that Congress may enact legislation that "expands" Fourteenth
Amendment rights." 9 It is careful, however, to affirm two related
rationales for Morgan's holding. One recognizes congressional power
to ban New York's English literacy test as a remedial measure for
discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.310 The other, of
more relevance here, upholds congressional power to ban the test as a
mechanism to address discrimination in public services. Morgan states
that the congressional ban offered New York's Puerto Rican commu-
nity "enhanced political power [that] will be helpful in gaining nondis-
criminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican
community." '311 Articulating what Professor Karlan has labeled the
"prospective model of constitutionally corrigible invidious discrimina-
tion,"32 Morgan upholds section 4(e) of the VRA because it "enables
the Puerto Rican minority better to obtain 'perfect equality of civil
rights and the equal protection of the laws.' "313 Boerne affirms the
validity of this rationale, stating that the exercise of congressional
power "rested on unconstitutional discrimination in New York."3"4
That this "unconstitutional discrimination" had in fact occurred
was essential neither to the Court in Morgan nor, notably, to the
Rehnquist Court in Boerne. Morgan and Boerne cite no evidence
suggesting that such discrimination had taken place and require no
specific congressional findings corroborating speculation about such
discrimination. Instead, Morgan invokes the extreme deference to
Congress for which the decision is remembered, finding it sufficient
that Congress could have found that such discrimination exists.
Morgan insists that "[i]t is enough that we be able to perceive a basis
embedding in a network of political institutions -juries, legislatures, constitutional conven-
tions, etc. - that help to define and enforce those rights" (footnote omitted)).
309. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
310. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641,654 (1966).
311. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
312. See Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 729.
313. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
345-46 (1879)).
314. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528.
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upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." '315 So
too, Boerne is apparently satisfied with the unsubstantiated assertion
that section 4(e)'s effort to avert prospective discrimination "rested on
unconstitutional discrimination in New York."3"6
Even so, Boerne and its progeny hardly embrace the deferential
stance Morgan employs. Morgan refuses to assess whether eliminating
New York's literacy test is an effective means to address invidious
discrimination in public services. Morgan states that only Congress can
make such determinations.317 The Boerne decisions, however, establish
that Congress does not have such unbounded discretion to craft
remedies.31s Under Boerne and its progeny, Congress may not dimin-
ish the prospect of invidious discrimination in public services by, for
example, abrogating New York's immunity from private suits alleging
such discrimination. The Boerne cases bar Congress from creating
such a regime, at least insofar as it acts in the absence of concrete and
substantial evidence documenting such discrimination.319
The Rehnquist Court nevertheless expressly affirms Morgan's
embrace of congressional power to regulate state political processes as
a means to diminish the prospect that invidious discrimination might
occur. While Morgan suggests virtually complete congressional discre-
tion to select among a host of remedies, section 4(e) of the VRA looks
good to the Court in Boerne because Congress selected precisely the
remedy that it did. Section 4(e), Boerne explains, is a vehicle "to give
Puerto Ricans 'enhanced political power' that would be 'helpful in
gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services.' "320 Boerne
sees section 4(e) as an effort to fix the state's political processes in
order to facilitate more responsive governance by the state itself. The
statute is entitled to deferential judicial review because it is structured
to maintain state primacy in the protection of individual rights. Boerne
thus asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers refused to
"giv[e] Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal equality, 32
315. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653.
316. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528.
317. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653 (stating that "[i]t was for Congress... to
assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations" including "the effectiveness of
eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil" and
noting "[i]t is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors").
318. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.
320. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 528 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652).
321. See id. at 521. For an argument that the Second Reconstruction achieves such pri-
macy, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1484, 1501 (1987) (arguing that "[a]fter Brown v. Board of Education and the vari-
ous civil rights acts, after the revolution in criminal procedure fostered by federal law and
federal courts, after the imposition of uniform federal standards for basic liberties under the
Bill of Rights, and after the proliferation of novel statutory 'rights' arising from the interven-
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while its preservation of Morgan suggests a willingness to defer to
congressional judgments regarding the measures and institutions
thought necessary to facilitate state fulfillment of this responsibility.
The Court, of course, need not rely on Congress to reform state
political institutions when a perceived defect in the political process
threatens to prevent a state from adequately protecting individuals
from discriminatory treatment. Bush v. Gore3 22 is but the latest in a
series of the Court's decisions that dramatically restructure the
processes of state governance based on newly derived constitutional
mandates. 23 To be sure, absent longstanding precedent and estab-
lished practice, the Rehnquist Court might have agreed with Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan that the Court should not enter the "political
thicket" for fear of undermining the Court's moral authority,2 " and
decide cases based on political philosophy rather than law.325 The
door, however, was already open and the Rehnquist Court made no
attempt to close it.326 Indeed, it has extended the foray into the thicket
by articulating new ways in which the Constitution mandates particu-
lar political structures at the state level.327 As Professor Pildes recently
tions of the welfare-regulatory state, it is the federal government, not the states, that appears
to be our system's primary protector of individual liberties").
322. 513 U.S. 98 (2000).
323. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Unwelcome Judicial Obligation to Respect Politics in
Racial Gerrymandering Remedies, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1404, 1428-29 (1997) (arguing that
when lower federal courts craft remedies under Shaw and its progeny, they "subordinate
states' political concerns to other, more sterile, redistricting criteria."); Katz, Federalism,
Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144, at 1201-02 (citing Shaw v. Reno in
arguing that the Rehnquist Court long demonstrates a commitment to a "dramatic restruc-
turing of state governance"); Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 785, 786 (noting paradox in
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny that "conservative judges extend the Equal Protection
Clause ... beyond the reach of precedent to significantly displace state control over legisla-
tive districting" and that these decisions "offend conservative conceptions of federalism.").
324. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266-67 (1962) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) ("The
Court's authority.., ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Such feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appear-
ance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements.").
325. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 (1969) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court was ill-equipped to decide
whether a multimember system was more "effective" to minority interests than single-
member districts: "[u]nder one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all
officers; under the other, minority groups have more influence in the selection of fewer offi-
cers"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (striking down New York
City's governing Board of Estimate as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also
Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
327. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (state judicial
canon barring candidates in judicial elections from announcing their views on disputed legal
issues violates the First Amendment); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567
(2000) (striking down the "blanket" primary as a violation of the First Amendment); Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (absence of uniform standards for assessing the voter intent on re-
counted ballots violates the Equal Protection Clause); cf. Arkansas Educ. Television
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observed, the Court "now routinely deploys constitutional law to
circumscribe the forms democracy can take ... [and] almost reflex-
ively acts as if it were appropriate for constitutional law always to pro-
vide ready answers as to what makes democracy 'best.' "328
Decisions such as Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party v.
Jones329 display the Court's confidence in its institutional capacity to
identify constitutional rules governing democratic participation. Bush
v. Gore reads the Equal Protection Clause to mandate consistent stan-
dards for assessing voter intent on disputed ballots.33 ° California
Democratic Party holds that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit a state-mandated blanket primary, a practice that permits
voters to vote, office by office, for any candidate on the ballot,
regardless of the voter's or candidate's party affiliation.33' These deci-
sions necessarily limit congressional power to regulate state and local
political processes pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.332 After Bush v. Gore, for example, Congress could not mandate
that different standards govern the counting of dangling chads from
disputed ballots in different jurisdictions, just as it is precluded from
mandating unequal apportionment among electoral districts.333 So too,
after California Democratic Party, Congress may neither authorize nor
mandate a blanket primary.
Even so, the decisions do not entirely foreclose congressional
action. Bush v. Gore appears to leave open the possibility that
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (First Amendment does not bar exclusion of third-
party candidate from televised debate); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S.
351 (1997).
328. Richard H. Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 156 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Constitutionalizing
Democratic Politics].
329. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
330. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) (per curiam) ("The formulation of uni-
form rules to determine intent based on these recurring circumstances is practicable and, we
conclude, necessary.").
331. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 581-82, 585-86.
332. Article I, section 4 permits Congress to regulate federal elections without regard to
the constraints of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.").
333. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577-81 (1964):
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause requires that a
State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legisla-
ture, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.
Id.; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (holding that Article I, section 2 "means that
as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much
as another's.").
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Congress could mandate specific technology or a uniform federal
standard to govern the recounts of disputed ballots. Such measures
could arguably be deemed to enforce the right to equal treatment
articulated in Bush v. Gore, and thus to satisfy Boerne's congruent and
proportional standard.3 11 So too, California Democratic Party would
seemingly allow Congress to prohibit the open primary, a practice that
resembles the blanket primary except for the fact that it requires
voters to select among the candidates from only one party in any given
primary election.335 While California Democratic Party expressly
declined to address the constitutionality of the open primary,336 the
similarity between the blanket primary and the open primary suggests
that Congress could bar the latter practice as a prophylactic measure
to enforce the associational rights of political parties.337
These decisions stand in curious relation to Shaw v. Reno and its
progeny. Like Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party, the
Shaw decisions read the Constitution to set forth a rule structuring
democratic governance. They locate within the Equal Protection
334. Cf Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential
Elections: Lessons From the Past and Reforms For the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851,
881-87 (2002) ("[Tjhe Court's recent equal protection ruling in Bush v. Gore expands the
range of potential Section 5 legislation in the presidential-election area[,]" while concluding
that Boerne will preclude many of these efforts); Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and
Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 683-89 & nn.307, 325 (2002) (citing a House Resolution
and a report by the independent National Commission on Electoral Reform each of which
would require states to "have in place ... uniform standards for defining what counts as a
vote").
335. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 576 n.6:
An open primary differs from a blanket primary in that, although as in the blanket primary
any person, regardless of party affiliation, may vote for a party's nominee, his choice is lim-
ited to that party's nominees for all offices. He may not, for example. support a Republican
nominee for Governor and a Democratic nominee for attorney general.
Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes: Political Parties, Asso-
ciational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 282-83 (2001)
[hereinafter Private Parties With Public Purposes]; Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional
Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 785 n.155 (2001).
336. California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 577 n.8. Commentators have noted that
the structural similarities between the open and blanket primaries leave the more widely
used open primary subject to constitutional attack. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen,
Point/Counterpoint: Do the Parties or the People Own the Electoral Process?, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 815, 830 n.60 (2001); Issacharoff, Private Parties With Public Purposes, supra note 335,
at 284-85; Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 705-06
(2001). But see Elizabeth Garrett, Law and Economics, 31 N.M. L. REV. 107, 131 (2001)
(noting that open primaries pose less of a threat to associational rights than do blanket pri-
maries); The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 259, 278 & n.78
(2000) (arguing that "open primaries appear to represent not a raid on the party by outsid-
ers, but merely an extreme loosening of the requirements for affiliation with a party" and
that this "affiliation, though temporary, was the touchstone for the Jones Court." (internal
citations omitted)).
337. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding congressional ban on
literacy tests); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. Of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (up-
holding constitutionality of literacy test).
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Clause a prohibition against districting plans in which race predomi-
nates over traditional districting principles, absent narrow tailoring
to a compelling governmental interest.338 And like Bush v. Gore and
California Democratic Party, they limit congressional power while still
preserving a realm for continued congressional action. The Shaw deci-
sions block Congress from authorizing racially predominant districting
absent a compelling justification, but nevertheless assume that compli-
ance with the VRA constitutes a compelling interest.339
The Shaw decisions, Bush v. Gore, and Califtrnia Democratic
Party, accordingly all articulate constitutional holdings that restructure
democratic governance at the state and local level while leaving to
Congress at least some authority to develop related rules. Given that
Shaw and its progeny directly implicate racial concerns while Bush v.
Gore and California Democratic Party do not, these decisions collec-
tively might suggest a degree of judicial receptivity to broad congres-
sional regulation of state voting regimes, regardless of whether the
local practices involve issues of racial representation.
To be sure, the Shaw decisions more expressly invite congressional
participation in the federal project of reinforcing representation at the
state level than do Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party.34
But this facet of Shaw and its progeny may stem simply from the fact
that the state defendants in these cases expressly invoked the federal
VRA as justification for their districting decisions, and thus may not
signal greater congressional authority in the realm of race and the
vote. If so, underlying the Boerne doctrine's preservation of the VRA
precedent may be an as yet evolving theory that Congress has consid-
erable leeway to devise measures influencing state voting and repre-
sentational regimes even outside the race context. Indeed, Boerne's
affirmation of Morgan's observation that state governments may be
insufficiently responsive to those excluded from the political process
suggests a willingness to defer to Congress when it acts to address such
exclusions, regardless of whether racial discrimination is the cause.34
Put differently, the Court's confidence in its own institutional compe-
tence to "constitutionalize democracy" does not necessarily preclude
congressional power to legislate at the margins with prophylactic rules.
338. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
340. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (assuming arguendo that compli-
ance with the Voting Rights Act can be a compelling state interest); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899, 915 (1996) (same).
341. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 528 (1997) (affirming Morgan's "ration-
ale" upholding § 4(e) of the VRA on the ground that Congress may bar literacy tests as a
mechanism to address discrimination in public services); see also supra notes and accompa-
nying text and infra notes and accompanying text.
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And yet, the Shaw decisions suggest that the Court is more recep-
tive to congressional participation in regulating state political
processes when Congress acts to address racial discrimination affect-
ing voting rights. Shaw and its progeny suggest that Congress may
authorize rules structuring the political process that the Court would
deem unconstitutional if authorized by another governmental entity.
Bush v. Gore and California Democratic Party do not appear to
recognize a distinct congressional power of this sort. In this sense,
these decisions suggest that Congress is entitled to more deference
when it legislates in the realm of race and the vote than when it acts
elsewhere.342
Such divergent receptivity appears puzzling. The warrant for
exclusive judicial action defining rules of democratic participation
seems strongest in cases involving both racial discrimination and the
right to vote. After all, when racial discrimination affects the right to
vote, it implicates two distinct grounds long thought independently to
warrant rigorous judicial review.343
Insofar as the Court is more receptive to congressional power in
this realm, the nature of the rules regarding which the Court looks to
Congress offers an explanation. Rules governing political participation
necessarily affect political outcomes. As a leading casebook explains,
"the election process emerges from previously fixed - and often care-
fully orchestrated - institutional arrangements that influence
the range of possible outcomes that formal elections and subsequent
policymaking can achieve."3" But while all rules sounding in electoral
"process" invariably shape substantive outcomes, only some rules
predictably redistribute political spoils among identifiable groups. The
Rehnquist Court may look to Congress to create the mechanisms
needed to address racial discrimination in the political process because
342. So too, the Court's decision in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), implicitly pre-
serves a realm for concurrent congressional action. Rice struck down as a violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment a state law that provided that only "Hawaiians" could vote for trus-
tees of the State's Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), a public agency that oversees pro-
grams designed to benefit the State's native people. The Court held that the restriction lim-
iting the OHA electorate to descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands
embodied a racial classification that denied non-Hawaiians the right to vote within the
meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to
Vote After Rice v. Cayeteno, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491 (2000) (discussing Rice). Rice invalidates
a state program that did not implicate the federal government's unique relationship and
obligation toward its native people, and thus potentially leaves room for congressional
action.
343. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (suggesting that
courts should rigorously review "legislation which restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation" as well as con-
duct reflecting "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect mi-
norities").
344. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 1.
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it views those mechanisms to be unavoidably outcome-based in this
redistributive sense. That is, it may see these mechanisms not simply
as procedural regulations, but as devices for deciding winners and
losers within the political system. Electoral rules derived to address
racial vote dilution, for example, purposefully shift political power to a
discrete and identifiable group of voters.
By contrast, decisions such as Bush v. Gore and California
Democratic Party articulate process-based holdings that less clearly
redistribute political benefits to identifiable groups. For all the charges
of partisanship Bush v. Gore generated,34 the legal rule it announces
- in contrast to the remedy it forecloses346 - appears to be a neutral
and objective one. More so than one-person, one-vote, the require-
ment that a uniform standard govern the assessment of recounted
ballots does not facially favor any particular substantive outcome.347 So
too, even if, as its supporters contend, the blanket primary favors
more moderate candidates, this result does not consistently redistrib-
ute power among identifiable groups in the same sense that racial vote
dilution claims do.
IV. CONCLUSION: KEEPING A NONPLENARY POWER NONPLENARY
Recognition of congressional power to address racial discrimina-
tion in state political processes, if understood in functional terms,
arguably demands recognition of congressional power to target politi-
cal-process disruptions that transcend racial discrimination. In United
States v. Reese, the Waite Court appeared to reject expressly the
possibility that Congress may intervene in state political processes
absent racial discrimination.348 But by the time the Court decided
Yarbrough, the Waite Court appeared more receptive to that pros-
pect, equating the corruption stemming from the "free use of money
in elections" with the racially motivated "lawless violence... out-
rage," and suggesting that both endanger good government.34 9 This
345. See, e.g., VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT (2001); ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000
(2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1723-24 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They
Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 738 (2001).
346. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics,
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1429-31 (2001); Klarman, supra note 345, at 1732-34; Larry D. Kramer,
The Supreme Court 2000 Term - Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 152-57
(2001); Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v.
Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 630-35 (2002).
347. See Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: A Tally of Two Countries, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2000, at A33 (discussing the importance of uniform standard for recounts).
348. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
349. See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884).
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observation implied previously unacknowledged congressional power,
but the Waite Court ended before it could explore the doctrinal con-
sequences. The Fuller Court that followed proved far less receptive to
congressional action in the electoral arena. °
So too, the scope of the Rehnquist Court's deference to congres-
sional action in the electoral arena remains unclear. The deference
accorded Congress in the realm of race and the vote suggests defer-
ence of a broader sort to electoral regulation more generally. Recent
decisions addressing the constitutional contours of democratic partici-
pation can be reconciled with such deference, but hardly establish it.351
The extent of judicial deference to congressional power to regulate
elections will be determined by future decisions by this Court, or its
successor.
Existing precedent nevertheless makes clear that while extensive,
Congress's power to block racial discrimination in voting is far from
plenary. Boerne states that Congress may not expand the rights pro-
tected by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 Thus, deference
notwithstanding, the Court would not permit Congress to mandate a
departure from the one-person, one-vote principle as a mechanism to
remedy racial discrimination in the electoral process.353 An attempt to
authorize purely race-based districting, without regard to the existence of
communities of interest, is likewise sure to fail. Even if the Shaw cases
could be read to leave open the possibility that Congress retains such
authority,354 the Court would no doubt view congressional legislation of
this sort to embody the type of race-conscious decisionmaking it under-
stands the Equal Protection Clause to proscribe.355
Section 2 of the VRA will test the limits of the Court's deference
to Congress's efforts to block racial discrimination in voting. As
amended in 1982, section 2 prohibits any voting "standard, practice, or
procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right... to
vote on account of race or color." '356 The constitutionality of the statute
is an open question.357 In significant respects, section 2 resembles the
350. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); see also supra note 104.
351. See text following supra note 339.
352. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
353. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (construing the Equal Protection
Clause to mandate equal apportionment among electoral districts).
354. See infra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
355. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926-27 (1995) (suggesting that if § 5 of the
VRA authorized the Department of Justice's black-maximization policy, it would raise "se-
rious constitutional concerns").
356. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
357. Commentators dispute the validity of § 2 under the Boerne doctrine. Compare
David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional En-
forcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REV. 31, 45-46 (arguing that § 2 remains consti-
tutional), and Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136, at 726
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statutory provisions the Court invalidated in Boerne and its progeny. As
it did with RFRA,3 58 Congress amended section 2 to "restore" a legal
standard expressly rejected by the Court as not constitutionally
mandated. Congress amended section 2 to create a results-based test for
racial discrimination because it disagreed with Mobile v. Bolden, which
construed the Fifteenth Amendment to proscribe intentional discrimina-
tion only.359 Also like RFRA, section 2 is based on relatively sparse
findings of intentional discrimination,3 ° applies nationwide, has no
termination date, and proscribes substantially more conduct than does
the Constitution.361
None of these characteristics, however, appears problematic if the
Court evaluates section 2 under the VRA precedent preserved in the
Boerne decisions and with the deference accorded in Lopez.362 Indeed,
in 1982, the adequacy of congressional authority to adopt a results-
based test for racial discrimination after Mobile prompted relatively little
discussion.363 The five pages the Senate Report devoted to the subject
invoke the VRA precedent later preserved in the Boerne cases. 364 They
attest to congressional authority to enact measures "going beyond"
(same), and Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J.
2537, 2544 (1998) (same), and Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Com-
prehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 132-
35 (2000) (same), with Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749-50 (1998) (noting that "[t]he political history of the 1982
[Amendments to § 2 of the VRA], and the structural relationship of the statutory and consti-
tutional standards, are indistinguishable from RFRA"), and Guard, Impotent Figureheads,
supra note 156 (arguing that § 2 cannot be distinguished from the statutes invalidated under
Boerne). See also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24, at 859-66; Erwin Chemerin-
sky, The Rehnquist Court and Justice: An Oxymoron, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 38
(1999); Gerken, supra note 222, at 1736-37.
358. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (RFRA was enacted to "overrule"
Employment Division v. Smith).
359. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); S. REP. No. 97-417 (1982). As
originally enacted, § 2 of the VRA tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, and
thus was thought to add nothing to the constitutional prohibition itself. See Chisom v. Roe-
mer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991) (Section 2 as originally enacted "was unquestionably coexten-
sive with the coverage provided by the Fifteenth Amendment"); Guard, Impotent Figure-
heads, supra note 156; Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60-61 ("[I]t is apparent that the language of § 2 no
more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment.... [and] that it was intended
to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."); see also
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 24.
360. Compare S. REP. No. 97-417, with Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (rejecting as inadequate
lengthy congressional findings).
361. See supra notes 221-222.
362. See Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives, supra note 136; see also supra
notes and accompanying text.
363. But see Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Ex-
ploration of the Conflict Between the Judicial "Intent" and Legislative "Results" Standards, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 689, 739-52 (t982).
364. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 39-43 & n.149.
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direct constitutional requirements so long as such measures are "appro-
priate and reasonably adapted to protect citizens" from a constitutional
violation. The results test was so adapted, the Report continued, given
the difficulties plaintiffs encounter in proving discriminatory intent on a
case-by-case basis, and the fact that practices that violate the results test
"perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination. 3 66 At the time,
the Court did not even deem the question of congressional authority
worthy of full consideration and summarily affirmed a lower-court
decision that held the amended statute to be appropriate enforcement
legislation.367 In recent years, however, individual justices have raised
questions about section 2's validity.368
Section 2's survival accordingly depends on whether the Court thinks
the statute better resembles the VRA provisions upheld in the VRA
precedent and Lopez than it does the statutory provisions challenged in
the Boerne decisions. A functional understanding of congressional power
to block racial discrimination in voting would permit the Court to deem
section 2 appropriate enforcement legislation.
The Court may, however, be unwilling to do so. If understood in
purely functional terms, the Court's preservation of the VRA precedent
in the Boerne cases and its affirmance of the VRA in Lopez v. Monterey
County suggest a congressional power that is potentially quite expansive.
Preserving state primacy to protect individual rights through the regula-
tion of the political process logically encompasses more than the corrup-
tion caused by racial discrimination. But even if the task were so limited,
the realm in which racial discrimination corrupts political processes is not
naturally circumscribed. What constitutes a racial classification is itself a
contested question,369 while the conduct that affects political processes is
neither self-evident nor necessarily bounded.37 ° The Court may well find
365. Id. at 40.
366. Id.
367. Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984) (affirm-
ing Jordan v. Winter, 604 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Miss. 1984)); United States v. Marego County
Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1556-63 (11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364, 372-75
(5th Cir. 1984); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 342-49 (E.D. La. 1983).
368. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 992 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
the Court has "assume[ed], but never directly address[ed]" the constitutionality of § 2 and
that § 2 is to be assumed constitutional "unless and until current lower court precedent is
reversed and it is held unconstitutional"); Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1028-29
(1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (writing separately to emphasize decision is one of statutory interpretation and
that "[n]othing in today's decision addresses the question whether § 2 ... is consistent with
the requirements of the United States Constitution").
369. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000) (stating that not all classifica-
tions based on ancestry are race based, but the one before the Court is).
370. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002); Lawsky, supra note 96, at 786
(arguing that VAWA is a valid enactment under the Nineteenth Amendment because politi-
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that the seemingly limited realm in which it presently defers to congres-
sional action is not so limited at all.
Indeed, the Court may already think so. The Court has recently
insisted that the Fifteenth Amendment does not proscribe racial vote
dilution,37' a claim that largely eliminates the Amendment as a source for
congressional authority to enact section 2 of the VRA. Locating the pro-
scription against racial vote dilution solely within the Fourteenth
Amendment should be of no consequence if, in fact, Congress's
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
are "coextensive. 37 2 The Court, however, may be moving toward distin-
guishing the two powers in order to narrow the realm in which it will
defer to congressional action.
The Court's goal may be to accord deference only when Congress
legislates pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. Such a move would
repudiate considerable precedent373 and largely abandon the functional
understanding of Congress's enforcement powers that has marked the
Court's approach to date. If the Court adheres to its recent claim that
intentional vote dilution does not deny or abridge the right to vote within
the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment, it would mean the demise of
section 2 of the VRA. By both limiting its deferential stance to the
Fifteenth Amendment and excluding racial vote dilution from that
Amendment's ambit, the Court would almost certainly render section 2,
with its proscription against such dilution, invalid under the Boerne
precedent. To be sure, the Court would still confront occasional claims of
intentional racial vote dilution brought directly under the Fourteenth
Amendment.374 Eliminated would be the far more numerous result-
based dilution claims now brought under Section 2.
Distinguishing congressional power under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments evokes the approach taken by Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion in Presley v. Etowah County Commission... to limit the
reach of the VRA. Presley holds that laws altering the powers exercised
by elected county commissioners are not changes "with respect to
voting" under section 5 of the VRA and accordingly not changes for
which preclearance is required. Justice Kennedy's opinion insists that
laws "with respect to voting" may be distinguished from the operational
provisions that render local governance possible.376 The distinction is a
cal citizenship "requires the ability to participate, free from domination, as a self-determined
individual").
371. See Bossier Parish II, supra note 30, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (stating that the Fifteenth
Amendment does not proscribe vote dilution).
372. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
374. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Gerken, supra note 222, at 1737.
375. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
376. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 494; supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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formal one that is difficult to defend in functional terms, or to reconcile
with the precedent.377 Instead, it reflects the perception that the VRA
was not meant to supplant local governance entirely. The Court thought
a line needed to be drawn and accordingly drew it.
378
The Court might similarly distinguish between Congress's enforce-
ment powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in order
to narrow the realm in which it will defer to congressional judgments.
But even if the Court adheres to precedent and retains its view that
Congress's powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are
coextensive, section 2 of the VRA remains vulnerable. The Court may
well be uneasy with the manner in which Congress exercises its power to
address racial discrimination within the political process. Critics of John
Hart Ely's argument that courts should police and cure defects within
political processes charge that the endeavor is impossible absent an out-
come-based view of what the political process should produce.379 Absent
such a view, the argument goes, courts will have no way of knowing
whether the political process is failing. The same, of course, may be said
about congressional efforts to reinforce representative governance at the
local level. Such efforts might as easily be creating defects in the political
process as curing them.
Equality in the political process is no more easily defined than equal-
ity in political outcomes. The formal equality to make contracts and own
property hardly gives rise to equality in wealth or business opportunity.
So too, formal equality to cast a ballot - indeed, even an undiluted
ballot - does little to ensure equality in the distribution of political
resources like money and incumbency.38 Efforts to rectify either practi-
377. A law that replaces an elected office with an appointed one is arguably a change "with
respect to voting" because voters no longer influence a decision they previously controlled. See
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). A law that diminishes the powers exercised
by an elected officials arguably implicates a similar interest.
378. See Presley, 502 U.S. at 509 (stating that "[t]he Voting Rights Act is not an all-
purpose antidiscrimination statute.").
379. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981) (arguing
that "most instances of representation-reinforcing review demand value judgments not dif-
ferent in kind or scope from the fundamental values sort ... [and] the parties' claims in fun-
damental values case are often directly translatable into representation-reinforcing claims");
Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) ("[T]he constitutional theme of perfecting the processes of gov-
ernmental decisions ... by itself determines almost nothing unless its presuppositions are
specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values -
the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to avoid."); Mark Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory,
89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980) ("[I]dentifying functional obstacles [to the assertion of politi-
cal power] both permits manipulation, which violates the restraint principle, and requires the
use of objective values."). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980).
380. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property,
49 UCLA L. REV. 1553 (2002).
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cal inequality may offend the formal equality in each context.381 Redis-
tributing wealth threatens interference with contract or property rights
while creating special districts or increasing the number of votes cast by
the politically disadvantaged arguably conflicts with formal political
equality.
Such concerns may lead the Court to extend the constitutionaliza-
tion of democratic governance employed in cases like Bush v. Gore
and California Democratic Party. Most dramatically, the Court could
hold that the substantive dictates of the Equal Protection Clause bar
the race-consciousness that inheres in section 2's ban on discrimina-
tory results and indeed in any law barring racially discriminatory
effects. Such prohibitions require those governed by them to consider
race expressly or risk violating the proscription.382 Decreeing the
Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe such considerations would
overrule considerable precedent,383 and invalidate numerous civil-
rights measures.3" It would constrict Congress's enforcement powers
to unprecedented levels.
The acceptance of race-conscious decisionmaking evident in
several recent decisions suggests the Court is unlikely to hand down
such a sweeping decision. Even so, other decisions energetically locate
within the Constitution's text substantive norms dictating specific demo-
cratic structures. These newly articulated constitutional rules suggest a
mechanism to limit congressional regulatory power over the political
process. Novel constructions of the Equal Protection Clause that
constrict such power are accordingly not implausible. The "constitution-
alization of democracy" may well be an ill-advised institutional endeavor
in its own right."' As a vehicle for limiting congressional power, it
threatens to obliterate it entirely.
381. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (1987) (argu-
ing that in both Lochner and Buckley "the existing distribution of wealth is seen as natural,
and failure to act is treated as no decision at all. Neutrality is inaction, reflected in a refusal
to intervene in markets or to alter the existing distribution of wealth").
382. See, e.g., Katz, Federalism, Preclearance, and the Rehnquist Court, supra note 144,
at 1205 (making this point); Lowenstein, supra note 144, at 825 (noting that under both § 2
and § 5 of VRA "race is a privileged criterion" and that "[t]he legislature and everyone who
participates in the process must begin with race"); Erickson, supra note 144, at 421.
383. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 531 U.S. 977 (2000); Lopez v. Monterey County, 525
U.S. 266 (1999).
384. See, e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000, 1001 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing
how Fair Housing Act's effect-based ban on racial preference in advertisements permissibly
leads to race-conscious decisionmaking).
385. See Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, supra note 328, at 159.
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